Individual Liberties and Intellectual Property Protection—Proprietary Software in Digital Electronic Voting Machines: The Clash Between a Private Right and a Public Good in an Oligopolistic Market. by Reddix-Smalls, Brenda
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 19 Volume XIX 
Number 3 Volume XIX Book 3 Article 2 
2009 
Individual Liberties and Intellectual Property 
Protection—Proprietary Software in Digital Electronic Voting 
Machines: The Clash Between a Private Right and a Public Good 
in an Oligopolistic Market. 
Brenda Reddix-Smalls 
Franklin Pierce Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Individual Liberties and Intellectual Property Protection—Proprietary Software in 
Digital Electronic Voting Machines: The Clash Between a Private Right and a Public Good in an 
Oligopolistic Market. , 19 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 689 (2009). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol19/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Individual Liberties and Intellectual Property Protection—Proprietary Software in 
Digital Electronic Voting Machines: The Clash Between a Private Right and a 
Public Good in an Oligopolistic Market. 
Cover Page Footnote 
I would like to thank the faculty and staff of Franklin Pierce Law School for their invaluable support 
without which this publication would not have been possible. My sincerest thanks to my family, Milton, 
Khalfani, Emeka and Kay; and to my student researchers Linda Hyunh, T. Primianno, J. Damani, D. Silva 
and R. Woods. 
This article is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal: 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol19/iss3/2 
VOL19_BOOK3_REDDIX-SMALLS 4/21/2009 7:53:39 PM 
 
689 
Individual Liberties and Intellectual 
Property Protection—Proprietary 
Software in Digital Electronic Voting 
Machines: The Clash Between a Private 





ABSTRACT .................................................................................... 690 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 691 
A. The Oligopolistic Marketplace ..................................... 695 
I. THE CONFLICT: BALANCING THE RIGHT TO VOTE VS. 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ........................................ 698 
II. INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES: CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR THE 
RIGHT TO VOTE ..................................................................... 707 
III. HAVA AND THE PROVISION OF FUNDS .................................. 719 
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: COPYRIGHTS—FEDERAL 
PROTECTION FOR A PROPERTY INTEREST .............................. 723 
 
A PDF version of this Article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=3022.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
∗ I would like to thank the faculty and staff of Franklin Pierce Law School for their 
invaluable support without which this publication would not have been possible. My 
sincerest thanks to my family, Milton, Khalfani, Emeka and Kay; and to my student 
researchers Linda Hyunh, T. Primianno, J. Damani, D. Silva and R. Woods. 
VOL19_BOOK3_REDDIX-SMALLS 4/21/2009  7:53:39 PM 
690 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:689 
A. Source Code and Object Code and Copyright  
Protection...................................................................... 728 
V. TRADE SECRETS—STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION.......................................................................... 731 
A. Oligopoly in the DRE Marketplace .............................. 739 







The convergence of intellectual property protections afforded 
software, the fundamental liberty interests of voting rights of 
Americans and the conduct of voting machine vendors within an 
oligopolistic marketplace signals grave consequences for the 
public.  In an election, Direct Recording Electronic voting 
machines (“DREs”) could be subject to malfunctions, inaccuracies 
and security problems.  The DRE vendors have consistently failed 
to improve the voting machines or allow access for independent 
auditing and security testing.  The vendors have operated 
collectively to maintain current inefficient output quality.  Acting 
in concert to obtain higher pricing, the vendors operate against 
their individual self-interests, claiming proprietary protections.  
The result of this oligopoly is serious—the voting process, a public 
good, is diminished.  Ultimately the federal judiciary and Congress 
will face the task of balancing these interests within the context of 
an oligopolistic marketplace.  At risk is an American liberty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A small number of vendors1 fueled by federal dollars2 supply 
the majority of Direct Recording Electronic voting machines (or 
“DREs”)3 to states in federal elections.4  These few DRE vendors 
 
 1 A handful of companies provide the majority of the voting machines to the states for 
federal elections including: Election Systems & Software (“ES&S”) (thirty-nine states), 
Premier (thirty-one states), Sequoia (eighteen states), Hart InterCivic (twelve states), 
MicroVote (three states), Advanced (two states). See infra Appendix I.  Company names 
were provided in response to a Freedom of Information Request sent by the author to all 
fifty states, the responses of which are on file with the author. 
 2 Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”), Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–545 (2006)).  HAVA became public law on October 29, 
2002. Id.  Among other matters HAVA established a program to provide funds to states 
to replace punch card voting systems and provided minimum election administration 
standards for states and units of local government with the responsibility for the 
administration of federal election. Id.  HAVA provided over three billion dollars to the 
states over four years to incentivize their transition to voting machine technology and to 
update election administration standards.  See the U.S. Election Assistance Commission 
(“EAC”) for the list of vendors registering  for certification under HAVA. 2006 U.S. 
EAC Ann. Rep. 22, available at http://www.eac.gov/about/report/docs/eac-
20ar2006.pdf/attachment_download/file [hereinafter 2006 ANNUAL REPORT]; see also 
Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1732 (2005) (“The legislation eventually enacted (HAVA) sets 
modest mandates for voting systems, while attempting to give the states incentives to 
upgrade to better technology. . . .  Title I of HAVA authorizes $650 million in payments 
to the states, half of which is for the replacement of punch-card ballots and lever voting 
machines.  States that choose to receive payments under Title I are obligated to replace 
their punch card and lever voting equipment by November 2004 . . . .”). 
3 The terms ‘direct recording electronic’ voting machines and ‘digital recording 
electronic’ voting machines (“DREs”) are used interchangeably. See Michael A. Carrier, 
Vote Counting, Technology and Unintended Consequences, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 645, 
646 (2005) (describing electronic voting machines by saying that “electronic voting 
machines [are] known as direct recording electronic devices (DREs)”); see also DIMITRIS 
A. GRITZALIS, SECURE ELECTRONIC VOTING 33 (2003) (“The fully computerized systems 
are of two formats—Direct Recording Electronic (DRE), where a voting kiosk (similar to 
an automatic bank teller machine) is provided at designated polling places, or networked 
systems that are used remotely, possibly via Internet/Web access.”); James Belmont 
Conn, Race Against the Machine: An Argument for the Standardization of Voting 
Technology, 12 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 181, 231 (2006).  Conn 
describes various voting technologies, such as Electronic Systems: 
With electronic voting, voter choices directly enter electronic storage, 
using touch screens, push buttons or keyboards.  Machines are 
typically programmed to prevent overvoting.  The most common 
models are ‘full faced,’ showing all contests at once, like lever 
machines, and a flashing red light alerts voters to the contests in 
which they have not yet voted. 
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effectively operate as an oligopoly—controlling price and access.5  
Simultaneously, within these DREs, the federally protected right to 
vote and the vendor’s rights in intellectual property are clashing as 
competing interests.6 
Scholars of divergent viewpoints have analyzed transparency, 
accuracy and software security issues attributable to electronic 
voting machines,7 including the lack of a paper ballot.8  Many 
 
Id. 
 4 Using HAVA as a base, the fifty states were sent a Freedom of Information request, 
as this was the most straightforward method to track purchases made with federal funds 
since 2002, when the Act was passed.  The fifty states purchased their direct electronic 
voting machine separately from the following most frequently named vendors: ES&S 
(thirty-nine states), the vendors which were formerly Diebold (thirty-one states), Sequoia 
(eighteen states), Hart InterCivic (twelve states). See infra Appendix I; BRENNAN CENTER 
TASK FORCE ON VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY, THE MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY: 
PROTECTING ELECTIONS IN AN ELECTRONIC WORLD 2 (2006), available at 
http://brennan.3cdn.net/a56eba8edf74e9e12e_r2m6b86s2.pdf (providing a list of certified 
vendors). 
 5 See infra notes 18–26 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 28–37 and accompanying text. 
 7 Critics of electronic voting machines have identified the transparency, accuracy and 
integrity issues existing within direct electronic voting machines.  See ERIC A. FISCHER, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ELECTION REFORM AND ELECTRONIC VOTING 
SYSTEMS (DRES): ANALYSIS OF SECURITY ISSUES 26 n.101 (2003), http://www. 
epic.org/privacy/voting/crsreport.pdf, for a discussion of security issues inherent in the 
new electronic voting machines designed to facilitate increased voting with accuracy and 
transparency for the populace. See, e.g., BEV HARRIS, BLACK BOX VOTING: BALLOT 
TAMPERING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2004); AVIEL D. RUBIN, BRAVE NEW BALLOT: THE 
BATTLE TO SAFEGUARD DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF ELECTRONIC VOTING (2006); ROY G. 
SALTMAN, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF VOTING TECHNOLOGY, IN QUEST OF INTEGRITY 
AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE (2006); Stephanie Philips, The Risks of Computerized Election 
Fraud: When Will Congress Rectify a 38-Year-Old Problem?, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1123 
(2006); Tokaji, supra note 2; see also David Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: 
Trade Secrets in our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 135 (2007). 
 8 Scholars claim that DREs with their inaccessible proprietary source code fail to 
provide the accuracy of reliable vote counting necessary for a transparent provision of a 
public good—voting. See, e.g., Herbert E. Cihak, The Help America Vote Act: Unmet 
Expectations?, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 679, 684 (2007) (“It is not apparent that 
the EAC, or Congress for that matter, fully understood the nation-wide ramifications of 
replacing punch card voting machines, lever voting machines, and paper ballots with 
electronic touch screen voting equipment.  As early as 1969, studies had surfaced which 
indicated that computerized voting presented a whole host of security issues.  Coupled 
with electronic voting machine security is the issue of electronic machine malfunctions.  
A substantial number of voting machine failures were unveiled during the 2006 primary 
election season.”); Matthew Fisher, Will Your Vote Count?: Can the Current Software 
Withstand and Guarantee the Constitutional Right to Vote?, 8 J. HIGH TECH. L. 91, 105 
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comments have been written critiquing the lack of access to DRE 
proprietary software for independent testing and auditing 
purposes.9  However, the effect of the DRE vendor oligopoly on 
the price and access of DREs in the marketplace has not received 
comparable attention. 
This Article contends that the lack of access to the proprietary 
software in the DREs is a function of market control exercised by 
the vendors.10  Furthermore, this Article argues that the DRE 
vendors are trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma11 concerning access 
to proprietary software as a function of the price of the voting 
 
(2008) (“The fear of an outside attack on a DRE voting machine occupies much of the 
public alarm over the use of electronic voting.  The possibilities for an attack on the 
software fit into three main categories, physical, code based, and result alteration.”). But 
see Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1716 (opining that DREs are better solutions than the old 
paper-based systems). 
 9 See supra notes 6–8. 
 10 Joseph Kattan & William R Vigdor, Game Theory and the Analysis of Collusion in 
Conspiracy and Merger Cases, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 441, 443 n.6 (1997) (“By market 
conditions or market characteristics, we refer to all of the factors that bear upon the 
ability of firms to achieve, monitor competitors’ adherence to, and punish deviations 
from an understanding.  These include concentration, information availability and 
quality, firm differentiation, cost characteristics, product differentiation or homogeneity, 
technological stability, transaction characteristics, trade customs and usages, buyer 
characteristics, entry conditions, and the ability of fringe firms to expand, among others.  
The terms market conditions or market characteristics are used for convention and are not 
intended to suggest that one or more elements of market structure are determinative of 
market performance.”). 
 11 In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
two prisoners . . . are being interrogated separately, if each tries to 
blame the other, each is sentenced to eight years in prison; if both 
remain silent, each is sentenced to one year.  If just one blames the 
other, he is released, but the silent prisoner is sentenced to ten years.  
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is an example of a 2 by 2 game, because 
each of the two players . . .  has two possible actions in his action set: 
Confess and Deny.  Each player has a dominant strategy. 
ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION, AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 21–20 
(4th ed. 2006).  This dominant strategy is one designed to maximize the individuals’ 
outcome in this incarcerated situation. Id.  “The Prisoner’s Dilemma crops up in many 
different situations, including oligopoly pricing, auction bidding, salesman effort, 
political bargaining, and arms races.  Whenever you observe individuals in a conflict that 
hurts them all, your first thought should be of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Id. at 21.  
However, if the two prisoners find a way to co-operate, then their outcome improves. Id.  
See infra notes 243–84 for a further explanation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
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machines.  The dominant (best) strategy12 for each individual DRE 
vendor normally would be to provide machines with software 
access at a price which maximizes profit.  Based upon the demand 
by the states, this would be a rational decision on the part of the 
DRE vendors.  The Nash equilibrium13 best position for each 
vendor ordinarily would be to deviate from any agreement among 
the vendors and provide access to the software to the voting 
public.14 
However, as part of an oligopoly, (which acts like a monopoly) 
the dominant strategy for the DRE vendors collectively is to 
“cooperate” and withhold access to software and maintain market 
control over the purchase and sale of the electronic voting 
machines.15 Absent careful oversight, a few private interests, the 
vendor owners, who preclude access to independent software 
 
 12 “A player’s dominant strategy is his strictly best response even to wildly irrational 
actions by the other players.” Id. at 20; see also MORTON D. DAVIS, GAME THEORY, A 
NONTECHNICAL INTRODUCTION 7 (1997) (“A strategy in game theory is a complete plan of 
action that describes what a player will do under all possible circumstances.”). 
 13 See infra note 266 for a discussion of the Nash equilibrium; see also Gregory J. 
Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law 
with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L. J. 719, 721 (2004) (“The key equilibrium 
concept in oligopoly theory is Nash, non-cooperative equilibrium, which in simple terms 
defines an equilibrium as a set of actions by players such that no player has an incentive 
to alter its action in light of the actions being taken by the other players.  This concept 
was introduced by mathematician John F. Nash, Jr. in 1950, and it earned him a share of 
the 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics.”) (citing John Nash, Non-Cooperative 
Games, 54 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS 286 (1951), reprinted in COURNOT OLIGOPOLY 82 
(Andrew F. Daughety ed., 1988)). 
 14 Guy Sagi, The Oligopolistic Pricing Problem: A Suggested Price Freeze Remedy, 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 269, 277 (2008) (“The well known ‘prisoners’ dilemma game,’ 
represents the basic game theory payoff matrix.  The famous paradox of this game is that 
both prisoners would have been better off, ex ante, if they could have reached a binding 
understanding to cooperate, but nevertheless the ‘Nash equilibrium’ of the game is to 
deviate.  The classic prisoners’ dilemma game is a static, non-cooperative, one-shot-
game.  However, when the game repeats itself, the players can potentially establish a 
cooperative strategy that will benefit all.  Cooperation comes about as a result of the 
players’ ability to retaliate in the following rounds if one player deviates from the 
mutually beneficial strategy to make a short-term profit.  Consequently, deviating might 
become an unprofitable strategy.”). 
 15 Id. (“Oligopoly firms face a situation that resembles a contest or game.  Each firm 
has to choose a strategy that will maximize its profits, taking into consideration its rivals’ 
strategies and reactions to the firm’s actions.  Each firm’s profit depends upon its rivals 
strategies and therefore the logic guiding each firm’s decisions is within the domain of 
game theory.”). 
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testing could dictate the integrity and security of an American 
good: the public vote.16 
To help understand and analyze the voting machine oligopoly, 
a quick examination of the marketplace looking at Game Theory17 
and the conflict between voting rights and intellectual property (or 
“IP”) protection follows. 
A. The Oligopolistic Marketplace 
The term oligopoly is derived from the Greek words meaning a 
few sellers.18  Oligopolies are markets where only a few number of 
firms operate.19  These markets are not competitive, in that prices 
are higher than prices that would occur in competitive markets but 
lower than prices occurring in markets with a monopoly.20  
 
 16 See infra notes 33–35. 
 17 DAVIS, supra note 12, at 3 (“The theory of games is a theory of decision making.  It 
considers how one should make decisions and to a lesser extent, how one does make 
them.”); RASMUSEN, supra note 11, at 11 (“Game theory is concerned with the actions of 
decision makers who are conscious that their actions affect each other.”).  Davis 
described the origin of game theory: 
The foundations of game theory were laid by John von Neumann, 
who in 1928 proved the basic minimax theorem, and with the 
publication in 1944 of the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 
the field was established.  It was shown that social events can best be 
described by models taken from suitable games of strategy.  These 
games in turn are amenable to thorough mathematical analysis. 
DAVIS, supra note 12, at x. 
 18 MARIA MOSCHANDREAS, BUSINESS ECONOMICS 148 (2d ed. 1999).  The few firms 
can either compete ruthlessly or collude and behave like a monopoly.  If they collude, 
they form a cartel to reduce output and drive up profits the way a monopoly does. 
Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New Model for 
U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE  J. ON REG. 55, 86 (2007). 
 19 Shelanski, supra note 18, at 86; see also Daniel R. Shulman, Proof of Conspiracy in 
Antitrust Cases & the Oligopoly Problem, 4 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 14 (2003) (describing an 
oligopoly as “[s]ix or fewer sellers, or in some cases buyers, dominate, and merely 
through conscious parallelism are able to set prices without regard to costs or competitive 
forces” (citing FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (decrying 
practices which impair “the ability of the market to advance social welfare by ensuring 
the provision of desired goods and services to consumers at a price approximating the 
marginal cost of providing them”))). 
 20 Id. (“‘Oligopolies’ are markets that contain a small number of firms.  Such 
concentrated markets are usually ‘imperfectly’ competitive: Oligopoly prices are 
generally higher than prices that result from perfect competition but lower than prices 
that result under monopoly.”). 
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Oligopolies are identified by behavior and resulting outcomes.  In 
an oligopolistic market, the firms are few such that each firm 
makes its price and output decisions knowing its individual 
decisions will affect the market and cause reactions by other 
firms.21  Firms in oligopolies often earn profits higher than 
necessary to keep competitive firms in the industry, and they are 
not constrained by competition.22  In short, firms in an oligopoly 
do not have to accept the prices dictated by the marketplace.23 
This Article suggests that not only do the DRE vendors control 
the price, but they also prevent the independent review and testing 
of their product (voting machines) by precluding software access.  
This Article argues that this could only occur through cooperation 
and collective action by the vendors.  This occurs even though 
DRE vendors provide a product traditionally created to be used as 
part of a public good (the voting process).  As a result the 
opportunity for corruption of this public good remains in the hands 
of private concerns—an oligopoly fueled by a one-time federal 
infusion of capital. 
The dictum in a Supreme Court case best summarizes a non-
illegal definition of oligopolistic behavior as tacit collusion 
between firms: 
 
 21 Shelanski, supra note 18, at 86; RESEARCH AND EDUC. ASS’N, ECONOMICS: A 
COMPLETE SOLUTION GUIDE TO ANY TEXTBOOK 754 (1980) (“A market has an 
oligopolistic structure if actions by one firm have such important effects upon rivals that 
these rivals will contemplate appropriate reactions, which may affect the original firm.  In 
other words, an oligopoly exists when each firm in an industry must contemplate the 
possible reactions of its rivals in deciding its own behavior.”). 
 22 Shelanski, supra note 18, at 86. 
 23 Id. (“Firms in oligopolies thus often earn profits higher than necessary to keep 
competitive firms in the industry and are not constrained, as firms facing perfect 
competition are, to accept passively the prices dictated to them by the marketplace.  The 
key feature of oligopolies, and the one that generates higher profits, is that there are few 
enough firms that each firm makes price and output decisions knowing its individual 
decisions will affect the market and cause responses by other firms.  Anticipation of those 
competitive responses may cause a firm to rethink what at first looks like a profit-
enhancing move.”).  “Demand is defined as a schedule which shows the various amounts 
of a product which consumers are willing and able to purchase at each specific price in a 
set of possible prices during some specified period of time.” RESEARCH AND EDUC. 
ASS’N, supra note 21, at 480.  Price then is the inverse function of said demand curve or 
schedule and represents the “monetary” amount that consumers are willing to pay for a 
specific amount of a product during some specified period of time. Id. 
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Tacit collusion, sometimes called oligopolistic price 
coordination or conscious parallelism, describes the 
process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a 
concentrated market might in effect share monopoly 
power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, 
supra-competitive level by recognizing their shared 
economic interests and their interdependence with 
respect to price and output decisions.24 
DRE vendors, by operating in a concentrated market and 
sharing monopoly power, set prices and control output decisions.  
Those decisions include preventing access, and possibly 
eliminating accuracy in the voting process in order to maximize 
supra-competitive profits.25  This Article proposes to show that the 
balance of the competing interests of voting liberties and 
intellectual property rights is negatively impacted by this 
oligopolistic marketplace. 
Game theory is a way of organizing a logical method of 
analyzing how two actors reach maximization of their profits, 
while considering the other firm’s possible reactions and 
strategies26 and can be useful in assessing the DRE marketplace.  
An analysis of various game theory applications shows that the 
dominant strategies for individual electronic voting machine 
owners would be to provide access for testing and independent 
auditing.27 
 
 24 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 
(1993). 
 25 Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 9, 54.  Piraino opines that the structure of oligopoly markets encourages 
anti-competitive conduct by allowing the oligopolists to coordinate their behavior to 
maintain prices above the normal competitive level. 
The weight of economic theory, however, now supports the 
conclusion that oligopolies do facilitate supracompetitive pricing.  In 
1838 Augustin Cournot published one of the first theses on 
oligopolistic behavior.  In his model, two theoretical oligopolists 
calculate their output so that, together, they will be able to achieve a 
profit-maximizing price approaching the monopoly level. 
Id. at 17. 
 26 See generally Sagi, supra note 14, at 277. 
 27 See infra text accompanying note 320. 
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In reality the DRE vendors are claiming copyright and trade 
secret protection and refusing to provide access or to alter the 
machines.  Using game theory analysis, this conduct on the part of 
the DRE vendors leads to the inevitable conclusion that the 
vendors operating in this oligopoly are acting cooperatively and 
controlling market access.  This constraint against auditing access 
occurs against a backdrop of the citizens’ constitutional right to 
suffrage versus the intellectual property rights of the authors of the 
machines’ source coding. 
I. THE CONFLICT: BALANCING THE RIGHT TO VOTE VS. 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Two federally protected rights, subsisting within DREs, are 
currently in conflict as competing interests.28  The right to vote in 
fairly conducted elections and the right to proprietary protection 
for IP are headed for a constitutional collision in elections using 
DREs.29 As one scholar opines: 
DRE voting machine manufacturers utilize 
proprietary code because this enables the 
manufacturers to take advantage of intellectual 
property protections, preventing substantive 
oversight.  By gaining protection for the software, 
 
 28 See Andrew Massey, “But We Have to Protect Our Source!”: How Electronic 
Voting Companies Proprietary Code Ruins Elections, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 
233, 235 (2004) (identifying the conflict between the federal right to vote and the 
intellectual property protections granted to proprietary software in electronic voting 
machines). 
 29 See Doris Estelle Long, Electronic Voting Rights and the DMCA: Another Blast 
from the Digital Pirates or a Final Wake Up Call for Reform?, 23 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 533, 548–89 (2005) (“Diebold’s use of the DCMA [Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act] to prevent the publication of information regarding security 
concerns with its voting software puts the Copyright Act on a direct collision course with 
the First Amendment. . . .  Nothing seems more ‘political’ than information about the 
reliability of voting machines, and, ultimately, the fairness of the election process.”); 
Massey, supra note 28, at 234.  Massey asserts that DREs pit the voting rights of the 
public against the proprietary rights of the software owners: “Unlike traditional paper-
ballot systems . . . [DREs] record votes in secret, meaning that the voting public has no 
idea whether its vote counted, and if it did count, whether, it went to the person for whom 
the voters voted.” Id.; see also Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1741–94 (providing a critique of 
clashing rights within electronic voting machines). 
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most likely through copyright the manufacturer of 
the DRE machine determines who can legally 
access and test the software.  Permitting a private 
company to exercise complete control over voting 
software enables the same private actor to remove 
transparency from elections.  The DMCA [Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act], enacted to update 
copyright laws for digital media, could potentially 
result in the copyright holder of voting software 
preventing any distribution of information about 
copyrighted material.  The control granted by the 
DMCA also permits a software owner to limit 
security testing of the software to owners or 
operators, precluding the ability of outsiders, who 
may have more experience or time, from gauging 
the ability of voting software to protect the 
information generated during an election.30 
Both the right to vote and proprietary intellectual property 
rights are sufficiently important to our democracy as to have 
achieved federal protection, either in the Constitution or by 
congressional action.31  Yet the vendors of DREs and owners of 
 
 30 Fisher, supra note 8, at 102; see also Long, supra note 29, at 540 (opining that 
proprietary source code with the help of the DMCA are in direct conflict with First 
Amendment rights and voting rights). 
 31 See Trevor Potter & Marianne Holt Viray, Federal Election Authority: Jurisdiction 
and Mandates, in RETHINKING THE VOTE: THE POLITICS AND PROSPECTS OF AMERICAN 
ELECTION REFORM 102, 103 (Ann N. Crigler, Marion R. Just & Edward J. McCaffery 
eds. 2004) (“The U.S. Congress has broad constitutional authority to regulate the times, 
places, and manner of federal elections . . . .  As a result of this authority, as well as the 
authority to ensure equal protection of citizens’ voting rights in state and local elections, 
the federal government is already an active participant in establishing election rules on 
issues ranging from voter registration to enforcement of equal access to voting booths.”).  
See also infra notes 59–132 for a discussion of the right to vote under the Constitution.  
Intellectual property protection originates in the Constitution and state and federal 
legislation. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (the Patent and Copyright Clause); 17 
U.S.C. § 4 (1909 Copyright Protection Act) (providing constitutional protection for 
patents and copyrights); Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124; Act of March 3, 1891, 
ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106 (extending copyright protection to foreign nationals and imposing 
copyright registration formalities); WENDY J. GORDON & RICHARD WATT, INTRODUCTION 
TO THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS passim 
(2003) (providing a discussion of the property rights theories supporting the use of 
intellectual property protections); see also infra notes 151–234. 
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proprietary software, receiving substantial public funds, have 
managed to protect intellectual property rights at the expense of 
voting rights.32 
The voting rights process in federal elections involves the 
provision of a public good,33 which in turn implicates the core 
values of citizen participation: transparency and equality of 
access.34  Admittedly, intellectual property rights benefiting voting 
machine vendor owners may promote innovation, profit 
 
 32 See generally Massey, supra note 28, at 235.  See Levine, supra note 7, at 138 (“But 
in late 2005, potential vendor Diebold . . . focused instead on its commercial property 
rights.  Rather than comply with the law, it brought a declaratory judgment action against 
the state, arguing that it could not supply the required information.  Diebold explained 
that some of the inner workings of its voting machines were a third party's intellectual 
property, likely trade secrets, to which it did not have access.  Therefore, Diebold claimed 
the information could not be shared with the state or the public without violating 
intellectual property rights or intellectual property licensing agreements with third 
parties, even if it had access to this information.” (citations omitted)); see also Long, 
supra note 29, at 541 (suggesting that the copyright protections of the source code under 
the DCMA are in conflict with the constitutional values of political speech and the 
integrity of the voting process); Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1779–80 (expressing concerns 
about the lack of auditing transparency because of both security and accuracy concerns).  
 33 See James Love & Tim Hubbarb, Paying For Public Goods, in CODE: 
COLLABORATIVE OWNERSHIP AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 207 (Rishab Aiyer Ghosh ed. 
2005) (“Among economists, a public good is one that, regardless of its cost to produce, is 
not rival in consumption.  That is to say, the marginal cost of sharing the good is zero, 
and the use of the good by an additional person does not diminish the availability of the 
good to others.  Another aspect of the economics definition concerns the ability to 
prevent others from benefiting from the good—sometimes referred to as non-exclusivity 
of consumption.”). 
 34 Levine, supra note 7, at 136 (“Transparency and accountability, especially in the last 
several decades, are among the core values that drive the fundamental model of a 
publicly elected and properly operating democratic government.”); see also Massey, 
supra note 28, at 235 (“The proprietary nature of the code requires a closed state review 
process that has not eliminated serious errors and security flaws because it limits the 
number of people testing the software.  That closed process also contradicts public policy 
and American tradition favoring openness through transparent and accountable 
government.  As a result, the electorate is forced to rely upon arguably substandard 
machines to conduct one of the most important functions of our democratic system.”); 
Lilian Mitrou et al., Electronic Voting: Constitutional and Legal Requirements, in 
SECURE ELECTRONIC VOTING 54 (Dimitris A. Gritzalis ed. 2003) (“A key element of 
democratic, free and fair elections is the trust and legitimization that is gained having a 
transparent vote casting and counting procedure.”). 
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maximization and a dynamic marketplace by securing protection 
for software in direct recording voting machines.35 
However, intellectual property laws protect the owners of 
proprietary software in DREs,36 without adequately safeguarding 
the voter’s right to a secure, fair and fraud-free election.37  Despite 
reports questioning the security and transparency of electronic 
 
 35 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (the Patent and Copyright Clause).  In Mazer v. 
Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), the Supreme Court identified one of the principles upon 
which the Copyright Clause was based: economics. Id. at 219.  The Court opined that the 
policy behind the Clause was to promote public welfare through private market 
incentives. Id.  “The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to 
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by 
personal gain is the best way to advance the public welfare through the talents of authors 
and inventors in ‘Science and the useful Arts.’” Id.; see also GORDON & WATT, supra 
note 31, at xvi (“In the absence of legal protection, a writer might be afraid of showing 
his manuscript to a publisher lest it be copied, without payment . . . without copyright the 
situation could resemble a prisoner’s dilemma . . . .  So a lack of copyright might lead to 
lack of payment and incentives for authors, and thus underproduction.”). See generally 
William Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 325 passim (1989). 
 36 See Fisher, supra note 8, at 102; Massey, supra note 28, at 234–35 (“The source of 
this problem is the proprietary source code that drives these paperless electronic voting 
machines.  Unlike paper-based voting machines, DREs operate entirely by computer, 
meaning that at no stage of the election process can the public see the physical counting 
of the votes.  Absent access to the source code that runs the DRE, the public has no way 
of knowing how—or if—the machine records and tabulates votes.  As a result, a growing 
chorus of critics claim that without the ability to scrutinize the process, the public has no 
way to protect against malicious manufacturers, elections officials, or voters from 
‘hacking’ the machines to ‘deliver’ votes to their chosen candidates.”). 
 37 Numerous reports and articles have been written concerning security flaws in DREs. 
See, e.g., RUBIN, supra note 7; Carrier, supra note 3, at 660 (“Another type of data fraud 
targets the record of all cast votes.  Anyone with access to this data could alter vote 
records and ‘generate or change as many votes as he or she pleased.’ Such votes ‘would 
be indistinguishable from the true votes cast on the terminal.’ But despite the critical 
importance of the vote records, one single DATA Encryption Standard (“DES”) key, 
f2654hD4, has encrypted all of Diebold’s vote records data since 1998.”); Massey, supra 
note 28, at 235 (“In practice, proprietary code-based DREs have proven to be error-
ridden and prone to security weaknesses because the closed nature of the code has forced 
state agencies to protect manufacturers’ intellectual property at the expense of a reliable 
voting system.”); DAVID JEFFERSON ET AL., A SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SECURE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION AND VOTING EXPERIMENT (“SERVE”) passim (2004), 
http://www.servesecurityreport.org/paper.pdf; MICHAEL A. WERTHEIMER, DIEBOLD 
ACCUVOTE-TS VOTING SYSTEM passim (2004), http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/ 
courses/tcr17-803/TA_Report_AccuVote.pdf; Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
News Office, Voting Technology Fact Sheet, July 16, 2001, http://web.mit.edu/ 
newsoffice/2001/voting2facts.html. 
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voting machines, Congress has failed to enact measures to require 
that DREs used in federal elections possess minimum software 
security protections.38 
In 2002, Congress passed HAVA to encourage states to 
upgrade voting technology and to increase the use of electronic 
voting machines.39  HAVA funneled over three billion dollars to 
states to assist in this technological transition.40  This federal 
infusion of monies into the private marketplace created a monetary 
incentive for states to purchase new voting machine technology.41 
In an effort to address the security issues with DREs, Congress 
proposed additional legislation mandating audits and banning the 
use of DREs not retrofitted with voter verified paper ballots in 
 
 38 See Carrier, supra note 3, at 646–47.  Carrier asserts that Congress passed 
“‘HAVA,’ which provided $325 million to the states to replace their punch card voting 
systems,” but that the Act does not remedy major deficiencies in electronic voting such as 
reduced transparency, with the possibilities of hidden trap doors in software eliminating 
millions of votes; increased magnitudes of error and fraud; and the lack of security 
controls, which “makes it astonishingly easy to change vote totals, register votes for 
unintended candidates, prematurely terminate elections, and erase the ‘audit log’ that is 
designed to trace such activity.” Id. at 646–47. 
 39 HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–545 
(2006)).  The bill passed Congress in 2002 in the wake of the presidential election of 
2000 where antiquated election administration and technology led to a national crisis 
during the election. See Daniel Palazzolo, Vincent G. Moscardelli, Meredith Patrick & 
Doug Rubin, Election Reform after HAVA: Voter Verification in Congress and the States, 
38 PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 515, 515 (2008), available at 
http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/38/3/515.pdf.  HAVA was designed to 
encourage the states to adopt and upgrade their election technology. See supra text 
accompanying note 39. 
 40 See Brian Kim, Help America Vote Act, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 579, 589 (2003) 
(“Title I of the Act contains provisions for replacing punch card machines and improving 
election administration.  The Act allocates $3.86 billion to states and localities to, among 
other things, improve the administration of federal elections, educate citizens about 
voting rights and procedures, train election officials and poll workers, improve or replace 
voting technology, and increase the availability of absentee ballots to overseas military 
voters.  For the first time, substantial amounts of federal funds will be used to help 
finance federal elections.”); 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 22; Tokaji, supra 
note 2, at 1733. 
 41 See Carrier, supra note 3, at 646 (explaining that “[m]any states have 
enthusiastically embraced” Congress’s invitation in HAVA by replacing punch cards 
with DREs). 
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federal elections.42  However, this proposed amendment to HAVA 
never passed. 
HAVA currently provides only limited safeguards for voter 
security.  Through copyright43 and trade secret44 protection, DRE 
manufacturers protect their software from competition and outside 
scrutiny.45  Without access to source code disclosure,46 
encryption47 standards and mandated independent random audits,48 
 
 42 See S. 1487, 110th Cong. (2007) (Senate bill “[t]o amend the Help America Vote 
Act of 2002 to require an individual, durable, voter-verified paper record under title III of 
such Act”); H.R. REP. No. 110-154, at 2 (2007) (House Report accompanying “[a] bill to 
amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require a voter-verified permanent paper 
ballot under title III of such Act, and for other purposes”).  These bills never passed 
Congress. 
 43 See Fisher, supra note 8, at 102 (“By gaining protection for the software, most likely 
through copyright, the manufacturer of the DRE machine determines who can legally 
access and test the software.”); Long, supra note 29, at 548–49; see also Kevin C. Earle, 
No-Copy Technology and the Copyright Act: Has the Music Industry Been Allowed To 
Go Too Far In Diminishing The Consumers' Personal Use Rights In The Digital World?, 
2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 337, 341–42 (2003) (“Not only does the Federally 
codified Copyright Act encourage creation and dissemination of intellectual works for the 
public welfare, but it also provides exclusive rights and rewards to the copyright owners.  
Thus, the Copyright Act was drafted to balance certain public interests by granting access 
to protected copyright materials while simultaneously reserving certain proprietary rights 
to authors of original works.”). 
 44 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ET AL., MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 617–18 (3d ed. 2004) (defining a trade secret as “[b]usiness 
information that is the subject of reasonable efforts to preserve confidentiality and has 
value because it is not generally known in the trade” and noting that  “[s]uch confidential 
information will be protected against those who obtain access through improper methods 
or by a breach of confidence”); see also MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND 
INTERNET LAW 4 (3d ed. 2006) (“One way for vendors to prevent users from freely 
copying their computer programs was to claim a program as a trade secret.”); infra notes 
203–30. 
 45 See Massey, supra note 28, at 241–44. 
 46 See MICHAEL D. SCOTT, LICENSING AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DESK REFERENCE 
746–47 (2004) (“‘Although ‘source code’ has been defined far more broadly in some of 
the literature in the field, and in some of the expert testimony in this case, more 
commonly the term ‘source code’ refers to a computer program written in some 
programming language . . . that uses complex symbolic names, along with complex rules 
of syntax.’” (quoting Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 44 
(D. Mass. 1990))). 
 47 See EPIC CRYPTOGRAPHY & LIBERTY SOURCEBOOK 1997 E-30 (David Banisar ed., 
7th ed. 1997) (“Through the use of cryptography, communication and information stored 
and transmitted by computers can be protected against interception . . . .  Modern 
encryption technology—a mathematical process involving the use of formulas or 
algorithms—was traditionally deployed most widely to protect the confidentiality of 
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proposed DRE legislation fails to provide for a fair, accurate and 
reliable voting system.49 
Scholars have argued for the use of voter verified paper trails 
(or “VVPTs”) in the voting process.50  VVPTs require that the 
voting machine issue a paper receipt indicating how a voter cast 
her ballot.  In the absence of public bid procedures for open source 
software51 in DREs, VVPTs simply do not offer a solution to the 
 
military and diplomatic communications.  With the advent of the computer revolution 
and recent innovations in the science of encryption, a new market for cryptographic 
products has developed.”); see also 47 U.S.C. § 605(d)(3) (2006) (defining “encryption” 
as “to transmit such programming in a form whereby the aural and visual characteristics 
(or both) are modified or altered for the purpose of preventing the unauthorized receipt of 
such programming by persons without authorized equipment which is designed to 
eliminate the effects of such modification or alteration”). 
 48 See Carrier, supra note 3, at 654–56 (“The completely paperless nature of DREs, 
along with the role of computers in each stage of the vote counting process, ensures that, 
of the five types of voting technologies, DRE fraud is least likely to be detected and most 
likely to have vast effects.  In addition, DRE fraud is possible at each stage of the voting 
process: before the election (through physically unsecured machines), during voting 
(through smartcards that allow voters to gain unauthorized access), and after votes have 
been cast (through votes that are misrecorded when registered or tabulated). . . .  For all 
of these reasons, the testing and certification process is critical.  Nonetheless, this process 
is flawed.  For starters, there is a ‘stunning lack of transparency’ surrounding testing and 
certification, which the companies complete in secret and refuse even to discuss.”). 
 49 See Massey, supra note 28, at 235 (“In practice, proprietary code-based DREs have 
proven to be error-ridden and prone to security weaknesses because the closed nature of 
the code has forced state agencies to protect manufacturers’ intellectual property at the 
expense of a reliable voting system.”).  Massey argues for the mandated “use of open 
source code to ensure transparency and accountability mandated by law.  In addition, 
states must eliminate escrow requirements to allow for public testing of the source code.” 
Id. at 236. 
 50 See Carrier, supra note 3, at 647 (proposing “electronic voting machines[,] a voter-
verified paper trail, random audits, open source software, [and] more robust certification” 
for the DREs). 
 51 STEPHEN J. DAVIDSON, STUART D. LEVI & LAWRENCE ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE 
SOFTWARE 2007: RISKS, REWARDS AND PRACTICAL REALITIES IN THE CORPORATE 
ENVIRONMENT 128 (2004) (“‘Open Source Software is software for which the underlying 
programming code is available to the users so that they may read it, make changes to it, 
and build new versions of the software incorporating their changes.  There are many 
types of Open Source Software, mainly differing in the licensing term under which 
(altered) copies of the source code may (or must) be redistributed.’” (citation omitted)). 
Open source software is typically distributed under two kinds of 
licenses: BSD or GPL.  Under the BSD license, a user may modify, 
recompile, and distribute the source code, so long as the original 
copyright is acknowledged.  By contrast, under the GPL license, a 
user may likewise modify, recompile and distribute the source code, 
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problem of privately held software lacking independent access for 
review.52 
As the authors of the Brennan Center for Justice, Election 
Results noted: 
The widespread adoption of voter-verifiable paper 
records does not, however, resolve the security, 
reliability, and verifiability issues with electronic 
voting that many groups, including the Brennan 
Center, have identified.  To the contrary, as the 
Brennan Center noted in its June 2006 
comprehensive study of electronic voting system 
security The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting 
Elections in an Electronic World, voter-verifiable 
paper records by themselves are “of questionable 
security value.”  Paper records will not prevent 
programming errors, software bugs or the 
introduction of malicious software into voting 
systems.  If paper is to have any real security value, 
it must be used to check, or “audit,” the voting 
system’s electronic records.53 
DREs store votes electronically, with the votes being submitted 
periodically throughout the election or collected on data storage 
cards.54  This information is transmitted over a network connection 
or via Internet to a central location for tallying.55  A software 
malfunction could trigger a number of problems including shutting 
 
but does not have to acknowledge a copyright, and more importantly, 
cannot claim any copyright for the altered source code.  The GPL 
license is the more prevalent of the two schemes, and is used in the 
popular Linux operating system to facilitate input from programmers 
interested in improving the system. 
Massey, supra note 28, at 240 n.39. 
 52 See Massey, supra note 28, at 236 (arguing that the VVPT is subject to the same 
risks as existing paper based voting systems and “does nothing to further the general goal 
of restoring legitimacy to voting”). 
 53 LAWRENCE NORDEN, AARON BURSTEIN, JOSEPH LORENZO HALL & MARGARET CHEN, 
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, POST-ELECTION AUDITS: RESTORING TRUST IN ELECTIONS 
2 (2007), http://electionaudits.org/files/Brennan%20Center%20Report%20on%20Post-
Election%20Audits.pdf. 
 54 See Fisher, supra note 8, at 96. 
 55 See Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1777. 
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down, counting two votes for every one vote and erasing entire 
numbers of votes from designated precincts.  A VVPT could not 
assure that the all votes are counted or even counted accurately.56 
As a result of the current proprietary protection for electronic 
voting machine software, a few private interests57 could dictate the 
security and integrity of American federal elections.  The result: an 
oligopolistic control of a public good—the democratic election 
process.58 
This Article will examine the interplay between the oligopoly 
held by DRE vendors, the intellectual property rights subsisting 
within the electronic voting machines, and the conflict between 
fundamental voting rights.  This Article proposes to do so by: (1) 
reviewing the right to vote and its place as a fundamental liberty; 
(2) examining the IP rights within DREs (copyrights and trade 
secrets); and (3) analyzing the marketplace for the oligopolistic 
effects of the DRE vendors. 
Ultimately this Article argues that intellectual property 
(copyright and trade secret) protections for voting machine 
software undermine the gains made by voting rights advocates 
during the past forty years.  More specifically, this Article 
contends that the creation of this oligopoly produces a market 
inefficiency (eliminating transparency, accuracy and voter 
participation) which prevents the public from controlling a public 
good and reaching a satisfactory balance between the two 
important interests.59 
 
 56 See NORDEN ET AL., supra note 53, at 46–59. 
 57 The major vendors of digital recording voting machines include the following firms: 
ES&S, Premier, Sequoia, Hart InterCivic, MicroVote, Advanced. See supra note 1 and 
accompanying text. 
 58 See Massey, supra note 28, at 235. 
 59 See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Paradox of Mass Democracy, in RETHINKING THE VOTE: 
THE POLITICS AND PROSPECTS OF AMERICAN ELECTION REFORM  210, 210 (Ann N. 
Crigler, Marion R. Just & Edward J. McCaffery eds. 2004) (“Most of us agree, however, 
that any truly democratic system must at a minimum meet three necessary conditions: (1) 
relatively wide, if not universal, suffrage; (2) a great degree of equality among those 
allowed to vote; and, perhaps most controversially; (3) some degree of thoughtfulness 
among voters.”). 
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II. INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES: CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR THE 
RIGHT TO VOTE 
The right to vote in a fairly conducted election is a 
constitutionally protected feature of United States citizenship.60  
Congress has the power to regulate federal elections pursuant to 
Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution (the Elections 
Clause)61 and Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 (the Necessary and 
Proper Clause).62  Based upon the utilization of voters’ registration 
requirements for federal elections, which are co-extensive with 
state election registration requirements and election processes, the 
federal guarantees for a fairly conducted election have been 
broadened to include state and local election processes.63 
A number of constitutional amendments and attendant statutes 
create and protect the right to vote.64  Carved out of historical 
 
 60 See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).  The Supreme Court in 
Reynolds invalidated an apportionment scheme in the state of Alabama. Id. at 568.  The 
Court held that the right to vote was a fundamental interest based upon the fact that the 
right to vote preserves all other rights. Id. at 560.  The Court held that the apportionment 
scheme, which relied on a sixty year old census, diluted a citizen’s right to vote based 
strictly on residency. Id. at 562.  This dilution was deemed to be a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 568.  The Court struck down the 
apportionment scheme and required that a bicameral system for apportionment be 
instituted such that representation be based on “one person, one vote.” Id. at 587.  
Reynolds was historic for its use of federalism to enforce a right to vote within a state 
election system. See id. at 574. 
 61 See U.S CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; 
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the 
Place of Chusing Senators.”); see also id. art. II, § 1 (providing for states to choose 
electors for President and Vice-President). 
 62 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 63 See CRAIG C. DONSANTO, IFES POLITICAL SCIENCE WHITE PAPER SERIES, 
PROSECUTION OF ELECTORAL FRAUD UNDER UNITED STATES FEDERAL LAW 3, 
http://www.moneyandpolitics.net/researchpubs/pdf/IFES_Nigeria_fraud_paper.pdf 
(explaining that the federal jurisdictional prerequisite is satisfied when a federal 
candidate is on the ballot or conduct occurs which impacts the voter registration process 
for a federal election or in a state where a person registers to vote simultaneously for 
federal as well as state and local offices). 
 64 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV; id. amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a), (b) (2006) 
(“Denial or Abridgement of Right to Vote on Account of Race or Color Through Voting 
Qualifications or Prerequisites; Establishment of Violation”); id. § 1973gg-9 (“Civil 
Enforcement and Private Right of Action”).  The 1965 Voting Rights Act (or “VRA”) 
was hotly contested and fiercely litigated. See generally American Civil Liberties Union, 
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movements for suffrage, protections for the right to vote have been 
addressed extensively by the Supreme Court.65 
 
ACLU Voting Rights Project Litigation, http://www.aclu.org/votingrights/ 
gen/36949res20080929.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).  The VRA contains what is 
known as a preclearance requirement.  The preclearance provisions (commonly known as 
“section 5 Preclearance”) require certain jurisdictions that used a discriminatory test or 
device for voting and in which voter registration or voting was depressed to preclear all 
their proposed changes in voting laws or practices. See Laughlin McDonald, Racial 
Fairness—Why Shouldn’t It Apply to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act?, 21 STETSON L. 
REV. 847, 848 (1992) (“Preclearance requires these jurisdictions to prove to federal 
officials that the changes do not have the purpose and will not have the effect of 
discriminating on account of race or color or membership in a language minority.  Voting 
changes that are denied preclearance are ineffective as law and are unenforceable.”).   
Other provisions of the Act include: 42 U.S.C. § 1973, prohibiting 
voting practices that ‘result’ in discrimination; 42 U.S.C. § 1973b, 
abolishing ‘tests or devices’ for voting; 42 U.S.C. § 1973j, 
establishing criminal penalties for violations of the Act; 42 U.S.C. § 
1973aa-6, establishing the right of disabled or illiterate persons to 
receive assistance in voting; 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1, abolishing 
durational residency requirements and establishing uniform standards 
for absentee voting in presidential elections; 42 U.S.C. § 1973d, f, 
providing for the appointment of federal examiners and observers; 
and, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b, 1973aa-1a, providing for special assistance 
to language minorities.  
Id. at 852 n.35; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (prohibits denial based on sex); id. 
amend. XXIV (eliminates poll tax); id. amend. XXVI (provides suffrage to persons 
eighteen years or older). 
 65 See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 187 (1980) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the 1965 Voting Rights Act and banning electoral changes which 
have both the intent and effect of discriminating against African Americans); Kramer v. 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 630, 633 (1969) (eliminating property requirements 
for eligibility to vote in a school district); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646–47 
(1966) (upholding the validity of 4(e) of the 1965 Voting Rights Act banning 
discrimination in voting); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665, 667 (1966) 
(holding states have the authority to establish the basic terms of voting conditions, but 
conditions that burden the franchise of voting will be “carefully and meticulously 
scrutinized” and that wealth is not a qualification for voting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 197–98 (1962) (subjecting district gerrymandering to federal court scrutiny and 
holding that it presented a justiciable question where voting issues are impacted); United 
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 322, 325 (1944) (finding that a vote is entitled to 
constitutional protection and a person cannot be denied that right to vote in a primary 
election and then have his vote count in a federal election); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (holding that the right to vote although not mentioned in the 
Constitution is a right which preserves all other rights); see also RUSSELL L. WEAVER, 
STEVEN I. FRIEDLAND, CATHERINE HANCOCK, DONALD E. LIVELY & WENDY B. SCOTT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMS 561 (2006) (“Notably missing 
from the Fourteenth Amendment’s ambit of concern, as initially framed, was the right to 
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The phrase “right to vote” is not found in the United States 
Constitution.66  Yet the right to vote is a fundamental liberty under 
which all other rights are exercised as articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Reynolds v. Sims67 and Harper v. Virginia State Board of 
Elections.68  Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause, the Harper Court held that the right to vote is fundamental 
and entitled to a strict scrutiny review because it protects all other 
rights.69  The Reynolds Court held that the right to vote freely for 
the candidate of one’s choice is the essence of a democratic 
society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of a 
representative government.70  At issue in Reynolds v. Sims was the 
state of Alabama’s apportionment scheme and whether it 
constituted discrimination under the Equal Protection clause.71  
The Court scrutinized restrictions on the right to vote and 
articulated that 
the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a 
free and democratic society.  Especially since the 
right to exercise the franchise in a free and 
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic 
civil and political rights, any alleged infringement 
of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and 
meticulously scrutinized.72 
Congress also has the power to provide states with federal 
funds to implement federal acts, such as those protecting the right 
to vote, through Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 (the  General 
 
vote.  Its omission reflected the reality that the constitutional impact would touch not 
only the South but the North.”). See generally J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND 
INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND 
RECONSTRUCTION (1999) (discussing voting rights, historical challenges and racially 
institutionalized discrimination practices affecting minorities in America). 
 66 See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370. 
 67 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964). 
 68 Harper, 383 U.S. at 665–66. 
 69 See id. at 667; Karyn L. Bass, Notes and Comments, Are We Really Over the Hill 
Yet? The Voting Rights Act at Forty Years: Actual and Constructive Disenfranchisement 
in the Wake of Election 2000 and Bush v. Gore, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 111, 134–35 (2004). 
 70 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561. 
 71 Id. at 536–37. 
 72 Id. at 561–62. 
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Welfare or Spending Clause).73  The Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Spending Clause to mean that Congress can provide 
funds to a state in a conditional manner to encourage state conduct 
in a particular area.74  In South Dakota v. Dole,75 the Court 
identified three requirements for Congressional appropriations 
pursuant to the Welfare Clause: Congress may provide federal 
funds to encourage state action when (1) the spending provides for 
the “general welfare” of the people; (2) Congress clearly specifies 
qualifications for receipt of the federal funding; and (3) the 
conditions of the funding clearly relate to the intent of the 
spending.76  This Spending Clause and the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation laid, in part, the foundation for Congressional 
implementation of HAVA, implemented to establish standards for 
states in the administration of federal elections.77 
In Buckley v. Valeo,78 the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of Congressional action to use its spending power 
“as a means to reform the electoral process.”79  Following Buckley, 
the Supreme Court as recently as Bush v. Gore80 recognized that 
the federal government has the constitutional authority to exercise 
regulatory power over state and local administration of federal 
elections.81 
 
 73 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . provide for the 
. . . general Welfare of the United States . . . .”); see also Potter & Viray, supra note 31, at 
105. 
 74 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). 
 75 Id, 
 76 Id. at 207–08; see also Potter & Viray, supra note 31, at 105. 
 77 HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–545 
(2006)) (stating in the preamble that the law was enacted “to establish minimum election 
administration standards for States and units of local government with responsibility for 
the administration of Federal elections”). 
 78 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 79 Id. at 90; see also Potter & Viray, supra note 31, at 105. 
 80 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 81 Id. at 110.  In Bush, the Supreme Court re-articulated an equal protection argument 
protecting the fundamental right to vote: 
[T]he right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental . . . 
.  The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of 
the franchise.  Equal protection applies as well as to the manner of its 
exercise.  Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the 
State may not, by arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one 
person’s vote over that of another. 
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The constitutional source of authority granted to the federal 
government to regulate and protect the right to vote in federal 
elections can be found in at least seven separate places.82  
Unfortunately, even with constitutional authority, voting as 
universal suffrage did not occur easily in the United States.  The 
history of America is replete with instances of overt aggressions 
against distinct vulnerable populations83 precluding their 
participation in the democratic government.  Perhaps none more 
identifiable with exclusion than the era of slavery, enforced 
servitude and exclusion from public participation as citizens 
targeted towards African-Americans.84  Initially the Thirteenth 
Amendment, designed to eliminate and release African-Americans 
from the horrors of slavery, did not provide the newly freed 
African-American with suffrage.85 
Congress enacted three subsequent constitutional amendments 
which directly impacted the right to vote for citizens.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution86 contains the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses which provided the 
 
Id. at 104 (paragraphing omitted). 
 82 These places include U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (the Elections Clause); id. § 8, cl. 
1 (the General Welfare or Spending Clause); id. cl. 18 (the Necessary and Proper Clause); 
id. amend. XIV (the Enforcement Clause); id. amend. XV (prohibiting denial of the right 
to vote on the basis of race); id. amend. XIX (prohibiting denial based on sex); id. amend. 
XXIV (prohibiting denial based on the payment of a poll tax); id. amend. XXVI 
(providing suffrage to persons eighteen and older); see Potter & Viray, supra note 31, at 
103. 
 83 Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in 
America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 431–32 (2006) (“In the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the westward expansion of the new nation ‘brought mass destruction 
to the American Indian population.’  But the legitimating frames remained largely intact 
under the doctrine of ‘Manifest Destiny,’ which ‘saw the Indian’s decline as an inevitable 
consequence of his racial and cultural weakness and the white man’s vigor.’  It was ‘our 
manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free 
development of our . . . multiplying . . . .’” (citations omitted)). 
 84 Id. at 432 (“During much of the time that Native Americans were being forced out 
of our young nation, an African slave population was being forced in.”). 
 85 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as 
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist 
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”). 
 86 Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”); id. § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
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main protections for the right to vote.87  The Equal Protection 
Clause grants Congress the power to enforce the right to vote.  It 
elucidates the power of the federal government by legislative and 
judicial means to enforce the fundamental liberties of citizenship.88 
The Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution89 was 
enacted in 1870 to prohibit state impediments which denied a 
person the right to vote on the basis of color or race.90  The 
southern states and individuals immediately engaged in acts and 
assaults which included poll taxes, literacy tests, disqualifications, 
intimidation, and terrorist acts designed to deprive African 
Americans of the right to vote.91 The Nineteenth Amendment92 
granted suffrage to women after a period of intense civil activity 
and political pressure in 1924.93 
 
 87 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 13 (2d 
ed. 2002) (“The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in 1868 largely to protect the rights 
of newly freed slaves and in its most important provisions says that no state can deny any 
person of equal protection of the laws or of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law.”); see also Crawford v. Marion, 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1611 (2008) (upholding an 
Indiana statute requiring government issued photo identification to vote as a sufficient 
means to justify any limitation imposed on voters); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–10 
(2000) (using an equal protection analysis to protect the fundamental right to vote). 
 88 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 89 Id. amend. XV. 
 90 Id. (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged 
by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.”). 
 91 See TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN’S EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1965–68, at 
1–22 (2006) (detailing the violent struggles of civil rights workers against state led voting 
rights suppression which culminated in the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act); 
DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE, THE RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN THE NEW 
WORLD 327 (2006) (“The tragic collapse of America’s postwar Reconstruction, which the 
racist North never seriously supported, led in the South to a long era of Jim Crow 
discrimination that relied, like slavery, on the fear and terror of institutionalized physical 
violence.”); Bass, supra note 69, at 116 (“In direct response to the post-Civil War 
amendments, the South enacted a number of ‘legal and extralegal’ reforms to limit the 
political power of freed black men and to enable the Southern caste system to continue.  
Strategic tools were employed . . . district gerrymandering, purposeful closing of black 
polling places, poll taxes, literacy tests, grandfather clauses, and above all else, waves of 
Ku Klux Klan terrorism in the form of lynchings and vigilante violence against blacks 
and white civil rights activists in the South.”). 
 92 U.S. CONST. amend.  XIX. 
 93 Id.  “The Constitution as originally drafted and ratified had no provisions ensuring 
equal protection of the laws.  This, of course, is not surprising for a document written for 
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This era, when coupled with the overt hostility towards 
American (Native) Indians and the removal of and land acquisition 
from native Latinos in the early settlement of the Southwest, 
reflects a period of racial animus, in conflict with the democratic 
principles of inclusion and equality.94  Consequently, the civil 
rights movement, emergent in the 1940s, identified as one of its 
principle goals the pursuit of the right to vote for all citizens, with 
the attendant democratic attributes of inclusion, access and 
equality.95 
 
a society where blacks were enslaved and where women were routinely discriminated 
against.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 642.  “The Nineteenth Amendment, adopted in 
1920, extended the right to vote to women and says that the ‘right of citizens of the 
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State 
on account of sex.’” Id.  at 842. 
 94 Juan F. Perea, A Brief History of Race and the U.S-Mexican Border: Tracing the 
Trajectories of Conquest, 51 UCLA L. REV. 283, 283 (2003) (“The conquest of Mexico 
between 1846 and 1848 has largely disappeared from public consciousness as a 
significant historical event with contemporary consequences.  Yet this conquest resulted 
in the annexation by the United States of approximately one-half of former Mexico, 
constituting most of the current southwestern United States.”).  Perea further asserts: 
Anglo-Americans together with Mexican Tejans fought a war of 
independence from Mexico in 1835.  Stephen Austin [Texan patriot] 
described the war in racial terms: “A war of extermination is raging 
in Texas—a war of barbarism and despotic principles, waged by the 
mongrel Spanish-Indian and negro race against civilization and the 
Anglo-American race.” 
Id. at 290 (citations omitted); see also SALTMAN, supra note 7, at 66. 
 95 See SALTMAN, supra note 7, at 137 (“An initiating factor [for the passage of the 
Voting Rights Amendment] was the heightened demand on the part of the black 
community of the South that their second-class citizenship be brought to an end [known 
as the civil rights movement] . . . .  The problem of African Americans in the South was 
not only their inability to vote; it was the pervasive segregation that resulted in inferior 
treatment in almost every aspect of life.”). 
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During the civil rights era,96 marked by sweeping civil 
disobedience and major pressure from civil rights activists, the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) was passed.97  The VRA 
addressed discriminatory election practices aimed at the exclusion 
of racial groups from the voting process.98  “The VRA and 
subsequent amendments established minority voting rights and 
protections against discrimination on the basis of race, language or 
color.”99 
North American voting rights jurisprudence has a long and 
storied history.  From elucidating an articulated “right to vote” to 
 
 96 Id. (describing a nationwide effort to obtain “civil rights” for all citizens irrespective 
of race, color, creed or nationality). 
It is not possible . . . to graphically detail the events of the 1950s and 
1960s that led to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 . . . .  Despite the Supreme Court 
ruling in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka in 1954 that school 
segregation was inherently unequal, little had changed in the years 
immediately afterward.  The Birmingham, Alabama, bus boycott, 
triggered by Rosa Park’s refusal to give up her seat to a white man, 
had occurred in 1955.  The following years were filled with 
demonstrations—“sit ins” that attempted to desegregate restaurants 
and restrooms, demands for “try on” privileges in clothing stores, and 
violent reactions by some whites.  Some blacks who had attempted to 
register to vote were summarily dismissed, others were shot down . . . 
. 
Id. 
 97 Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”), Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also Potter & Viray, supra note 31, at 
108 (“The VRA and subsequent amendments established minority voting rights and 
protections against discrimination on the basis of race, language, or color.  It abolished 
the use of literacy tests, ‘good character’ vouchers, and voter requirements impeding the 
right to vote, and it granted language minorities the right to register and vote in their own 
languages.  The VRA also enabled voters to challenge discriminatory voting practices.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 98 SALTMAN, supra note 7, at 137 (“While the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts 
were intended to end the unconscionable discrimination against African Americans, the 
elimination of voting restrictions due to race would apply also to American Indians, 
Alaskan Natives, and Asian Americans.”). 
 99 Potter & Viray, supra note 31, at 108 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973); see SALTMAN, 
supra note 7, at 141 (“The original Act of 1965 was prefaced with the explanation that it 
was ‘An Act to enforce the 15th Amendment to the constitution of the United States, and 
for other purposes.’”).  The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Voting 
Rights Act in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). See SALTMAN, supra 
note 7, at 143. 
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prohibiting unconstitutional state action, the federal courts 
ultimately forged a protectionist stance towards voting as a 
fundamental right and individual liberty.100  In the twentieth 
century, impediments or restrictions on voting rights by a state 
were subjected to strict scrutiny and review by the federal courts.  
Routine election disputes, however, were subjected to a balancing 
test with a sliding scale of review required by the courts.101  State 
election administration and efficiency were considered to be the 
province of the individual states where very little federal 
intervention occurred.102 
In 2000, a controversial presidential election would change all 
of that, bringing the federal government into a statewide 
election.103  The controversial Bush v. Gore104 ruling was the result 
 
 100 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 842 (“In addition . . . the Supreme Court repeatedly 
has declared that the right to vote is a fundamental right protected under equal protection 
. . . .  Thus it is clearly established that laws infringing on the right to vote must meet 
strict scrutiny.”). 
 101 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992), for a less strict balancing test for 
voting restrictions imposed by a state where the restrictions are not onerous and the state 
has a legitimate interest in the regulation thereof.  Burdick 
requires courts to conduct a threshold balancing of the challenged 
law’s burden on voters against the importance of the purported state 
interest at stake: if the burden is heavy and the state interest slight, 
the law is reviewed under the . . . standard of strict scrutiny . . . while 
if the burden is slight and the state interest significant, the law is 
examined under the easily met rational basis standard. 
 Id.; see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that 
Virginia’s poll tax was unconstitutional as inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause). 
 102 See Bass, supra note 69, at 138.  Bass analyzed the level of scrutiny applied to such 
cases: 
Arguably, the level of scrutiny in federal voting rights cases should 
be strict because of the fundamental interest involved.  However, 
with the current Supreme Court ever-watchful of federalism, it has 
waffled on the scrutiny applied to more nuanced voting rights cases, 
thus making it difficult to draw a line between when strict scrutiny is 
triggered and when some lesser level of scrutiny is sufficient. 
Id.; see Demian A. Ordway, Disenfranchisement and the Constitution: Finding a 
Standard that Works, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1174, 1177 (2007) (“Burdick emphasized voting 
as an individually held right and proceeded to evaluate whether that right was burdened 
by the state law.” (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434)). 
 103 See Bass, supra note 69, at 137 (“The level of scrutiny applicable to Voting Rights 
Act claims, in light of Bush v. Gore, focuses on the remedial avenues available to citizens 
whose right to franchise has been abridged.  The expansive view of voting in Bush has 
opened a window of possibility.  The Court opened the opportunity by applying a novel 
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of a close presidential race in 2000 between Vice-President Albert 
Arnold Gore, Jr. and Texas Governor George W. Bush.105  The 
election was held on November 7, 2000.106  The next day, Bush 
was reported to have been the winner.107  The difference in Florida 
votes between Bush and Gore was less than one percent.108  With 
less than one half of a percent of the vote separating the 
candidates, Florida law provided for a recount.109 Gore asked for 
the recount in four counties.110  However, the Florida Secretary of 
State refused to extend the deadline for the recount past November 
14, 2001.111 
The election was certified on November 26, 2000, naming 
Bush the winner.112  Gore filed a contest under Florida law that a 
state court denied and dismissed.113  The Florida Supreme Court 
reversed in part, ordering a manual recount in all counties where a 
recount had not been held.114 
 
equal protection analysis, with no legal precedent, to the fairness in a state’s mechanisms 
and procedures of the fundamental right to vote.”); Carrier, supra note 3, at 646.  See 
Paul Charton, Frying Pan or Fire: Legal Fallout from the Contested 2000 Presidential 
Election, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 669, 669 n.1 (2007) for a summary of books 
and articles describing the 2000 presidential election including: BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, 
BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (2002); RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING 
THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, How Should We Think About Bush v. Gore, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (2002); 
Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1219 
(2002); Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from 
Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170 (2001). See also National Archives and 
Records Administration, 2000 Presidential Election: Popular Vote Totals, 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/2000/popular_vote.html (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2009). 
 104 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 105 Bass, supra note 69, at 126. 
 106 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 860. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. (“On November 8, the Florida Division of Elections reported that Bush had 
received 2,909,135 votes and Gore had received 2,907,351 votes.”). 
 109 Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 102.141(4) (2000)). 
 110 Id. 
 111 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 101 (2000). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Richard L. Hasen, After the Storm: The Uses, Normative Implications, and 
Unintended Consequences of Voting Reform Research in Post-Bush v. Gore Equal 
Protection Challenges, in RETHINKING THE VOTE: THE POLITICS AND PROSPECTS OF 
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The Florida Supreme Court remanded the matter to the trial 
court.115  A second trial judge ordered the manual recounts to 
begin.116  Bush filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and a stay in 
the U.S. Supreme Court.117  The recounts were underway when the 
Supreme Court stayed the Florida Supreme Court’s order, 
suspended the recount and decided to hear the Florida 
controversy.118  The parties had effectively turned an election 
dispute occurring within a state into a matter for the federal 
judiciary to resolve.119 
As the presidency hung in the balance, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to answer questions of law regarding the 
constitutional issues raised by the Florida election crisis. . . .  
[including] “[w]hether the Florida Supreme Court established new 
standards for resolving Presidential election contests, thereby 
violating Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution and 
failing to comply with 3 U.S.C. § 5, and whether the standardless 
manual recounts violates the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses.”120 
The Supreme Court held that the recount mechanism utilized 
by the Florida Supreme Court failed and “[did] not satisfy the 
minimum requirement for nonarbitrary treatment of voters 
necessary to secure the fundamental right” to vote pursuant to the 
Equal Protection Clause.121  The Supreme Court utilized an equal 
protection standard by stating that “the right to vote as the 
legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its 
fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote 
and the equal dignity owed to each voter.”122  Despite later 
 
AMERICAN ELECTION REFORM 185, 190 (Ann N. Crigler, Marion R. Just & Edward J. 
McCaffery eds. 2004). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1725. 
 120 Bass, supra note 69, at 130–31 (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000)). 
 121 Bush, 531 U.S. at 105.  See Hasen, supra note 114, for a recap of the 2000 
presidential election disputes. 
 122 Bush, 531 U.S. at 104. 
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vociferous criticism of the Court’s reasoning,123 the Court used an 
equal protection platform to expand oversight of the electoral 
process, and held that whenever a particular voting procedure 
effectively “value[s] one person’s vote over that of another” there 
appears to be a plausible claim for an equal protection violation.124  
It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court has articulated a 
new equal protection analysis for garden-variety election 
disputes.125 At first blush, it would appear that in Bush v. Gore the 
Supreme Court mandated the use of the equal protection strict 
scrutiny test for voting claims as opposed to the balancing test 
outlined in Burdick v. Takusi.126 
Although it is difficult to predict whether the Supreme Court 
will continue to analyze voting disputes using the strict scrutiny 
test, a recent case seems to indicate that the Court will use the 
balancing analysis in assessing burdens on the right to vote.  In 
Crawford v. Marion,127 an equal protection challenge to a voter 
identification law that required voters to show proof of eligibility 
to register and to vote, the Supreme Court went back to a balancing 
test analysis.128  In Crawford the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
balancing approach initially outlined in Anderson v. Celebrezze129: 
In Anderson v. Celebrezze . . . we confirmed the 
general rule that “evenhanded restrictions that 
protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral 
 
 123 See Erwin Chemerinsky, How Should We Think About Bush v. Gore, 34 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 1, 5 (2002). 
 124 Bush, 531 U.S. at 104–05. 
 125 Hasen, supra note 114, at 191–93. 
 126 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992).  Burdick calls for “application of 
a deferential, ‘important regulatory interests’ standard for nonsevere, nondiscriminatory 
restrictions, reserving strict scrutiny for laws that severely restrict the right to vote.” 
Crawford v. Marion, 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1624 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).  Burdick 
requires the courts to use a balancing test which requires the courts to conduct a threshold 
balancing analysis of the challenged law’s burden on the voters against the importance of 
the state’s interest. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; see also supra note 101. 
 127 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. 1610. 
 128 In Crawford the Court held that the states’ interests in deterring and detecting voter 
fraud, and participating in an effort to modernize election procedures and safeguard voter 
confidence were sufficiently weighty to justify under an equal protection standard any 
limitation (such as requiring voters to produce government issued IDs) imposed on the 
voters. Id. at 1617–19. 
 129 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
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process itself” are not invidious and satisfy the 
standard set forth in Harper [v. Virginia Board of 
Elections].  Rather than applying any “litmus test” 
that would neatly separate valid from invalid 
restrictions, [in Anderson] we concluded that a court 
must identify and evaluate the interests put forward 
by the State as justifications for the burden imposed 
by its rule, and then make the “hard judgment” that 
our adversary system demands.130 
In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court did not rule on whether the 
use of inaccurate voting equipment violated equal protection.  The 
Court did identify the technology used in the voting process as an 
issue for legislative bodies to examine for improvement.131 
As the 2000 presidential election drama played out in Florida, 
clamors for Congress to take action arose.  Bush v. Gore may not 
be the precedent-setting case which resurrected judicial review of 
strict scrutiny for all state action concerning voting rights.132  
However, the 2000 controversial presidential election and its 
judicial progeny—Bush v. Gore—were catalysts for HAVA, which 
mandated improved technology for the states handling federal 
elections.  HAVA also provided the monies for upgrading voting 
systems that fueled the current voting machine vendor oligopoly. 
III. HAVA AND THE PROVISION OF FUNDS 
Nearly thirty-seven years after the passage of the VRA, and 
against the backdrop of the controversial 2000 presidential 
elections, Congress passed HAVA in November 2002.  The Act 
was designed to incentivize states to improve election-system 
 
 130 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 
(1966) and Anderson, 460 U.S. 780). 
 131 Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1725 (“What is significant about the opinion, for purposes of 
understanding the subsequent changes in voting technology, is its recognition that the 
election exposed a serious but previously overlooked problem in need of attention.”). 
 132 Hasen, supra note 114, at 191–93. 
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standards,133 by encouraging states to upgrade their voting 
systems.134  The Act: 
• Authorizes $650 million to purchase punch card 
voting machines from the states; 
• Creates an Election Assistance Commission to 
serve as a national clearinghouse for 
information and review of procedures for 
federal elections; 
• Allocates $3.86 billion in election fund 
payments to the states over four years to help 
finance a variety of election improvement 
projects; 
• Establishes minimum standards for state 
election systems and directs the Department of 
Justice to monitor and enforce these standards; 
• Creates the Help America Vote Foundation and 
College Program to encourage college students 
to assist in the administration of state and local 
elections; 
• Mandates provisional ballots by 2004 and 
statewide computerized voter database by 2006; 
and 
• Reduces postage rates for official election 
mail.135 
HAVA as a guideline for selecting the most reliable electronic 
voting machines for federal elections was and remains woefully 
 
 133 HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–545 
(2006)); see also Carrier, supra note 3, at 646  (“The 2000 presidential election had a 
searing effect on this nation.  Few who witnessed the events in Florida could displace the 
images of election officials peering at punch cards, struggling to determine the intent of 
voters.  Congress, for example, did not forget.  Congress did not wish to see the scenes 
from Florida replayed in future elections.  And so, in 2002, it enacted the Help America 
Vote Act, known as ‘HAVA . . . .’”); Potter & Viray, supra note 31, at 110; Steven 
Ramirez & Aliza Organick, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Race and the Integrity of 
Democracy in America, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 427, 435 (2007) (“[HAVA] was passed as a 
response to the controversies surrounding the presidential election of 2000.”). 
 134 Lillie Coney, A Call for Election Reform, 7 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 183, 184–85 
(2005). 
 135 Hasen, supra note 114, at 110. 
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inadequate.136  Although HAVA “provides substantial funding to 
upgrade voting technology and make other improvements in voting 
systems,” it unfortunately “provides [only] limited guidance on 
what type of voting equipment should be implemented, with few 
binding mandates.”137 
Significantly, HAVA provides few protections for voting rights 
against tampering, mistakes and frauds which could occur on an 
electronic voting machine with copyright and trade secret-
protected proprietary software.138  The Act does not require 
verified voter paper trails to ensure against hacking or computer 
malfunctions.139 
HAVA established the Election Assistance Commission 
(“EAC”) without granting any enforcement or regulatory 
powers.140  The EAC has no power to issue any rules and 
 
 136 Ramirez & Organick, supra note 133, at 435 (“In general ‘HAVA provided money 
and imposed some very general standards, while leaving most of the details of election 
administration to the states and counties.’  In other words, ‘Congress effectively punted.’ 
. . .  HAVA also appears to attempt to resolve issues of auditability. . . .  Specifically, the 
Act requires that the voting system produce a record of audit capacity.  In addition, 
HAVA mandates a ‘permanent paper record’ but provides no clarification to states as to 
what that ‘permanent paper record’ should record.  Nor is there a definition of what is 
being audited.”). 
 137 Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1734. 
 138 See SALTMAN, supra note 7, at 196.   
This groundbreaking Act of Congress (Public Law 107-252, October 
29, 2002) was adopted almost two years after the 2000 general 
election.  The Act has been called ‘an anemic piece of legislation’ . . . 
but, considering the situation beforehand, it was a giant step forward. 
. . .  Establishment of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) 
was a core decision of the act . . . . 
Id.  Saltman contends that the Commission has limited authority and no regulatory 
enforcement powers. Id. at 196–97. 
 139 See Ramirez & Organick, supra note 133, at 437 (calling the failure to address this 
shortcoming of HAVA “a ticking time bomb”); supra text accompanying notes 50–52. 
 140 See Ramirez & Organick, supra note 133, at 437 (“Nor can the EAC [Commission] 
remedy this confounding statute.  Instead, HAVA strips the EAC of any regulatory 
power; it is a mere funding authority and advisory commission.  The Act specifies that 
the EAC shall not have any new governmental power to ‘issue any rule, promulgate any 
regulation, or take any other action which imposes any requirement on any State or unit 
of local government.’”).  The EAC can only promulgate advisory standards concerning 
DREs and software security. Id. at 436; see SALTMAN, supra note 7, at 196 
(“Establishment of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) was a core decision of the 
act. . . .  The commission has no federal regulatory authority . . . .”). 
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regulations, or to take any actions which impose requirements on 
any State.141 
There are no mandatory basic encryption standards for the 
transmission of votes or the use of vote recording equipment in 
HAVA.142  Nor are there any regulatory provisions requiring 
software owners to allow access to their proprietary software for 
independent testing or auditing by citizens, or non-governmental 
entities.143  With increased funding for upgrades to voting 
procedures, states have adopted and implemented the use of DREs 
in large numbers.  Unfortunately HAVA—the only federal 
legislation designed to regulate DREs—fails to provide basic 
protections for the public’s right to transparency and security in the 
electronic voting process.144 
HAVA was designed to encourage a state to improve its 
election system standards and thereby encourage the use of 
electronic voting machines.145  HAVA funneled money to states to 
purchase and use electronic voting machines.146  Yet HAVA fails 
to adequately provide needed protections required for the efficient 
provision of this public good—accuracy, transparency and security 
 
 141 Ramirez & Organick, supra note 134, at 437. 
 142 See HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–
545 (2006)). 
 143 See id. 
 144 See William A. Wright, Comment, Public Access to Vote-Counting Software, 1995 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 547 (1995) (providing a discussion on the technology of vote counting 
software).  Wright argues that the current and “suggested security provisions” in vote-
counting software do not adequately assure accurate and fair vote counting and that they 
are not consistent with a public policy of access to vote counting software. Id. at 548; see 
also Cihak, supra note 8, at 685 (“As the 2006 election year cycle unfolded, it became 
increasingly clear that in addition to problems with the installation of new electronic 
voting equipment, there were other difficulties which plagued the implementation of two 
more key state HAVA provisions: procedures for the administration of elections and 
issues dealing with voting accessibility for several population groups.”). 
 145 See HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666; Hasen, supra note 114, at 110; see 
also Philips, supra note 7, at 1156. 
 146 Philips, supra note 7, at 1156 (“HAVA mandates that each state receiving federal 
funds for the improvement of its federal voting systems replace all ‘punch card voting 
systems or lever voting systems’ prior to January 1, 2006.  This means that optical scan 
and DRE voting machines will be virtually universally utilized in federal elections 
beginning in 2006.  Included in HAVA are mandatory ‘voting systems standards’ that 
states must follow for voting machines used in federal elections. . . .”). 
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in elections using electronic voting technology.147  HAVA lacks 
provisions for: (1) a verified voter paper trail; (2) source code 
disclosures for adequate security testing; (3) encryption measures; 
and (4) mandatory standards.148  A recently proposed amendment 
calls for a verified voter paper trail but fails to require source code 
disclosures or encryption measures.149 
Coupling the above circumstances with the presence of only a 
small number of vendors for the entire field of manufacturers 
creates a problematic paradigm.  An oligopolistic industry for 
DREs was fueled by the infusion of monies from the federal 
government under HAVA. 
Existing voting rights laws were not crafted to protect the 
public’s interest in security and transparency in the digital age of 
computer voting.  The voting legislative history focused on issues 
of equality and inclusion with very little attention directed toward 
security and transparency of the voting process.150  The enactment 
of HAVA set off a clash between emergent digital technology and 
voting rights.  At this point, voting rights are losing the battle. 
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: COPYRIGHTS—FEDERAL 
PROTECTION FOR A PROPERTY INTEREST 
The United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, 
protects patents and copyrights, as part of the intellectual property 
regime in this country,151 by providing that Congress shall have the 
power “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”152  Unlike the 
 
 147 See sources cited supra notes 7 & 144. 
 148 See HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666. 
 149 H.R. REP. No. 110-154, at 13 (2007). 
 150 See VRA, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 151 See MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at 308 (“Certain creations of the human mind [are] 
given the legal aspects of a property right . . . [i]ntellectual property is an all 
encompassing term now widely used to designate as a group all of the following fields of 
law: patent, trademark, unfair competition, copyright, trade secret, moral rights, and right 
of publicity.”). 
 152 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
VOL19_BOOK3_REDDIX-SMALLS 4/21/2009  7:53:39 PM 
724 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:689 
“right to vote,” intellectual property protections were articulated in 
the Constitution from the outset as individual property rights.153  
The Constitution and its iteration of “useful Arts” identify the 
commercial thrust of this legislation and its utilitarian nature.154  
Intellectual property rights were embedded in the Constitution with 
a “limited time” to provide incentives for innovation.155 
Based on this constitutional grant of authority, Congress 
enacted copyright protective legislation in the Act of 1790.156  
Copyrights, a federally protected right granted to fixed, original 
works of authorship, confer the exclusive right to exploit the work 
in specified ways for a limited period of time and have been 
protected by federal statutes since the 18th century.157  Following 
the Act of 1790, copyright law was expanded to include musical 
compositions158 as well as additional federal jurisdiction to 
determine copyright matters159 with Congress ultimately 
implementing the Copyright Act of 1909.160 
 
 153 Id.; Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (superseded 
by Copyright Act of 1976 and amendments); Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 
1106 (The Chase Act) (extending copyright protection to foreign nationals and imposing 
copyright registration formalities); Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124; 
SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 60–61 (Cambridge University Press 2003). 
 154 See SELL, supra note 153, at 60–61  (“The emphasis on ‘useful Arts’ underscores the 
commercial intent of the legislation and the utilitarian rationale behind it.  IP rights were 
devised to create incentives for innovation and risk-taking.”). 
 155 See id. at 61. 
 156 See Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
 157 See id.; SELL, supra note 153, at 61 (“The United States passed its first Copyright 
Act in 1790, which gave citizens and residents a copyright for fourteen years, renewable 
for an additional fourteen if the author was still alive.”). 
 158 See White-Smith Music Publ. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 14 (1908) (discussing 
copyright infringement of musical compositions).  White-Smith involved the use of 
perforated music rolls and whether their use constituted an infringement of musical 
compositions. Id. at 15.  “Musical compositions have been the subject of copyright 
protection since the statute of February 3, 1831, ch.16, 4 Stat. 436, and laws have been 
passed including them since that time.” Id. at 26–27.  In White-Smith, the Court held that 
the rolls did not constitute copying. Id. at 31–32. 
 159 Act of Feb. 15, 1819, 15th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 Stat. 481; see WILLIAM PATRY, 
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, VOL. 1, at 38 (1994) (noting the federal courts were not 
granted original jurisdiction over copyright cases until 1819). 
 160 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (superseded by 
Copyright Act of 1976 and amendments). 
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Originally extended to maps and charts in the 18th century,161 
today copyright protection can subsist within a novel, play or even 
a musical score,162 granting the author protection from 
unauthorized copying, reproduction or appropriation for original 
works.163 
The Copyright Act of 1976,164 in a sweeping legislative 
overhaul, established broad categories of copyrightable subject 
matter.165  However, the question as to whether copyright 
protection existed in computer software was not completely 
resolved by the Copyright Act of 1976.166 
Some scholars argue that a pattern of change has occurred in 
copyright law which favors the interests of private stakeholders.167  
They contend that the content specific language of newer copyright 
 
 161 The Copyright Act of May 31, 1790 provided protection for the author or her 
assigns of maps, charts, and books for two fourteen year terms, an original and a renewal 
term. 
 162 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).  Copyrightable subject matter has been divided into eight 
categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works; (3) dramatic works; (4) pantomimes and 
(5) choreographic works; (6) pictorial, graphic and sculptural works; (7) motion picture 
and (8) audiovisual works. Id. Novels are covered under id. § 102(a)(1), plays are 
covered under id. § 102(a)(3) and musical scores are covered under id. § 102(a)(2). See 
Long, supra note 29, at 533 n.34 (“Thus federal copyright protection in the United States 
has expanded from the narrow categories of protection of charts, maps and books . . . to 
include photography, motion pictures and computer software.”). 
 163 17 U.S.C. § 102 (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which 
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the 
aid of a machine or device.”); see Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124; 
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 164 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006)). 
 165 See supra note 162. 
 166 See I.T. Hardy, Six Copyright Theories for the Protection of Computer Object 
Programs, 26 Ariz. L. Rev. 845, 847 (1984) (“Source programs are unquestionably 
protected by copyright; the rub comes with object programs.  The first problem with 
object programs is determining what they are in the terms of the 1976 Copyright Act.”); 
Robert A. Kreiss, Comment, Section 117 of the Copyright Act, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1497, 1511 (1991) (“To achieve the proper balance, CONTU recommended two principal 
changes in the 1976 Copyright Act.  The first change was designed to assure computer 
programmers that computer programs could be copyrighted and that duplicates of a 
program on disks or tape would be considered ‘copies’ for purposes of copyright 
infringement.”). 
 167 See SELL, supra note 153, at 63. 
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laws renders it inflexible and incapable of adapting to 
technological change.  As a result, whenever new technology 
appears, the law fails to accommodate the change.168  Then the 
private stakeholders push for broader legislation, narrowly tailored, 
designed to give the copyright owners broader and greater 
rights.169  Such laws they argue operate to the detriment of the 
public, the original beneficiaries of copyright law.170 
Computer software171 is designed to function in a utilitarian 
manner.172  This makes it difficult to define software within an 
intellectual property regime.  Patent and trade secret law were 
 
 168 See Long, supra note 29, at 540 (“Given the increasingly rapid development of 
technology in the Digital Age, the need for Congress to revise legislation to correct 
oversights and mistakes becomes even more critical.  This need should be directly 
contrasted with the purported ‘need’ to provide special legislation to protect a particular 
industry.”). 
 169 “The Copyright Act has been amended more times than its sister laws—trademarks 
and patents.  Of these amendments, many have been designed to protect particular 
industries, such as the exemption of computer software and sound recordings from the 
strictures of the First Sale Doctrine codified in [§] 109 of the Copyright Act.” Id.  Long 
opines that such exclusions should have been the exception and should have only 
occurred to balance copyright privileges and public access when undue prejudice to the 
copyright exists. See id.; see also Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and 
Patent Trolls: The Divergent Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 
689, 690 (2006) (The “income-generating value of intellectual property gives intellectual 
property owners incentives to influence the direction of legislative change in order to 
maximize intellectual property returns.  Highly visible examples of changes that arguably 
benefited intellectual property owners include time extensions such as the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act, which protects creative works for as long as 120 years, 
and the 1995 revisions to the Patent Act, which changed the calculation of patent term to 
20 years from filing.”). 
 170 SELL, supra note 153, at 63.  There is a “legislative pattern in United States 
copyright law of privileging private interests of authors and owners at the expense of the 
interests of the public in use and reuse of copyrighted information.” Keith Aoki, 
(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of 
Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1310 (1996). 
 171 Software is a “set of computer programs, procedures, and possibly associated 
documentation concerned with the operation of a data processing system, e.g. compilers, 
library routines, manuals, circuit diagrams.  Contrasts with hardware.” U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, COMPENDIUM II: COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 326 (1984), available at 
http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/CopyrightCompendium/fplchome.asp [hereinafter 
Compendium II]; SCOTT, supra note 46, at 741 (“Software”). 
 172 See LEMLEY, supra note 45, at 33 (“Computer software, by its very nature as written 
work intended to serve utilitarian purposes, defies easy categorization within our 
intellectual property system.”). 
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designed to protect new utilitarian property.  Copyright law, on the 
other hand, was designed to protect original literary works.173  The 
stage was set for an expansion of copyright laws to include 
emerging computer software technology.174 
Congress established the National Commission on the New 
Technological Uses of Copyright Works (“CONTU”) in 1978.175  
CONTU’s mission was to study copyright law and its 
interrelatedness to computer programs.176  CONTU’s Final Report 
contained recommendations that were the results of hearings and 
investigative studies.177  Congress requested that the Commission 
study policy questions in the copyright field.178  One of the 
problems assigned to the Commission was the question of the 
scope of extension of copyright protection to computer 
programs.179  CONTU’s recommendations were ultimately adopted 
by Congress as the amendments of the 1980 Act.180  
 
 173 See id. 
 174 See SELL, supra note 153, at 63 (“Over time, the scope of subject matter eligible for 
copyright protection has broadened considerably.  For example . . . ‘the major computer 
lobbyists in the United States pressed for computer programs to be protected by accretion 
by treating them as literary works within traditional norms of copyright; and they now 
have persuaded much of the world to adopt this approach.’” (quoting W.R. Cornish, The 
International Relations of Intellectual Property, 52 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 55 (1993)). 
 175 FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF 
COPYYRIGHTED WORKS (1978), available at http://digital-law-online.info/CONTU/PDF/ 
index.html [hereinafter CONTU Final Report]. 
 176 See Christian H. Nadan, Software Licensing in the 21st Century: Are Software 
“Licenses” Really Sales, and How will the Software Industry Respond?, 32 AIPLA Q. J. 
555, 564–65 n.20 (2004) (CONTU was “a congressional commission created to 
‘recommend changes in the Copyright Act to accommodate advances in computer 
technology.’”) (citing DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 
1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 177 See CONTU Final Report, supra note 175, at 1. 
 178 See id. 
 179 See id. at 1, 9–46. 
 180 See H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, sec. 8 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 
6482 (noting that the 1980 amendments to the Copyright Act were intended to implement 
CONTU’s recommendations); Kramer Mfg., v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 432 n.8 (4th Cir. 
1986) (“The [A]mendments of 1980 followed the Final Report of the Commission on 
New Technological Uses of Copyright[ed] Works (CONTU) . . . [t]he Amendments of 
1980 conformed to [CONTU’s] recommendations.”); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula 
Int’l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (“[T]he most valuable legislative 
history materials concerning the Copyright Act of 1976 and the Amendment of 1980 are 
the reports of CONTU.”). 
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Unsurprisingly, software was included as a copyrightable subject 
matter in CONTU’s recommendations.181 
The 1980 amendment to the Copyright Act, extended copyright 
subject matter protection to application programs and operating 
system programs in both object code and source code versions.182  
This amendment opened the door to the current legal conflict 
which occurs when DREs are used with copyright protected 
software inaccessible to the public during federal elections.183  The 
inaccessibility of the software for independent review and auditing 
purposes means that the public cannot ascertain whether hacking, 
fraud or corruption of the voting process has occurred.184  Private 
vendors, owners of protected intellectual property, now exert 
access control in an area where voting—a public good—exists.  
The stage is set for a clash. 
A. Source Code and Object Code and Copyright Protection 
In order to operate, DREs use computer operating systems.  
These systems employ computer programs containing object and 
source codes.  The object185 and/or source code186 is usually the 
 
 181 See LEMLEY, supra note 45, at 35 (“Congress implemented CONTU’s 
recommendations in 1980 by adding a definition of ‘computer program’ to [§] 101 of the 
Copyright Act and amending [§] 117 of the Act to authorize the owner of a copy of a 
computer program to make another copy or adaptation of the program for the purpose of 
running the program on a computer.”). 
 182 Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015. “‘A copyright 
program, whether in object code or source code, is a ‘literary work’ and is protected from 
unauthorized copying, whether from its object source or source code version.’” 
MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at 405 (quoting Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer 
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1240 (3d Cir. 1983)). 
 183 Massey, supra note 28, at 234 (“The source of this problem is the proprietary source 
code that drives these paperless electronic voting machines.  Unlike paper based voting 
machines, DREs operate entirely by computer, meaning that at no state of the election 
process can the public see the physical counting of the votes.  Absent access to the source 
code that the runs the DRE, the public has no way of knowing how—or if—the machine 
records and tabulates votes.”). 
 184 Id. at 235. 
 185 MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at 409 (“Object code is [t]he lowest level of computer 
language.  Object code is ‘machine readable’ by a computer and cannot be read by 
humans.  Object code is often expressed in binary language, using ‘on-off’ or ‘0-1’ 
notation such as ‘01101001’.  Computer programs written in source code are readable by 
human and are written in computer languages such as BASIC or FORTRAN.  However, 
computers cannot understand source code, so to use the program, it must be translated 
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property of the vendor owners of the machine and is subject to 
copyright protection.  The purchaser of the machine, typically a 
governmental entity generally, has limited access to this 
copyrighted protected material without permission. 
The term source code refers to a computer program written in 
programming language that uses complex symbolic names, along 
with complex rules of syntax.187  Some of the languages are 
BASIC, COBOL or FORTRAN.188  The purpose of the source 
code is to provide instructions to the computer to perform a 
particular task.189  CONTU also weighed in on the definitions of 
object code and source code in its final report to Congress.190 
Object Code is most succinctly defined as: 
[A] translation of the source code language into the 
machine language of the computer (e.g. binary 
coding using zeros and ones or hexadecimal coding 
using letters and numbers or octal coding using zero 
to seven) that the computer executes.  Only 
instructions expressed in object code can be used 
‘directly’ by the computer.191 
A government or public entity who has purchased a DRE that 
relies on object and source code, absent cooperation, cannot 
validate that the code is operating as it should, is not subject to 
unusual errors or irregularities or contains vulnerabilities which 
subject the entire process to hacking, subversion or manipulation.  
The governmental entity has to rely upon the owner or vendor of 
the machine for assurance that the voting machine will operate, or 
has operated (after an election), as it should for the purposes of a 
 
into machine-readable object code.  Computer programs written in both source code and 
object code are copyrightable and can qualify as trade secrets.”); see Whelan Assocs. v. 
Jaslow Dental Lab. Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d Cir. 1986) (“In every program, it is the 
object code, not the source code, that directs the computer to perform functions.  The 
object code is therefore the final instruction to the computer.”). 
 186 See supra note 46 for a definition of source code. 
 187 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 44 (1990). 
 188 Compendium II, supra note 171, § 321.01. 
 189 See generally RUBIN, supra note 7, at 3; Massey, supra note 28, at 238. 
 190 CONTU Final Report, supra note 175, at 21 n.109. 
 191 SCOTT, supra note 46, at 553; see also CONTU Final Report, supra note 175, at 21 
n.109. 
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fairly conducted election if the vendor owner disallows access to 
the software for testing.  The voter as the end user of the computer 
voting machine has even less access to the computer program.  The 
DRE vendor with copyright and trade secret protections for its 
software does not provide an independent right of review or audit 
of its property.  Thus the voter cannot affirm that his or her right to 
participate in a fairly conducted election has not been 
circumvented by faulty or even ineffective computer programs for 
voting, or recounting purposes.192 
In addition, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”),193  passed by Congress in 1998, poses problems for 
voting rights.  Originally created as an uneasy solution to the 
problems of copying on the Internet,194 the DMCA was designed to 
eliminate the contributory liability of Internet service providers for 
the transmission of allegedly infringing works.195  The DMCA 
provided safe harbors for Internet service providers who were then 
obligated to protect the rights of copyright owners after receiving 
notice of infringement from the copyright holder.196  The Internet 
provider had to “take down” the infringing material or suffer the 
loss of the safe harbor provisions.197 
In addition to the notice and take-down provisions, the DMCA 
contains subpoena power for the copyright holder.198  This power 
allows the copyright holder to procure a subpoena from a federal 
district clerk to obtain disclosure from the service provider of the 
identity of a purported infringer.199  This disclosure provision 
designed “to protect music from digital pirates” provides a chilling 
 
 192 See Massey, supra note 28, at 242–43 (noting that auditing, without access to the 
proprietary source code, “becomes a pointless endeavor because all an auditor has to 
work with is potentially flawed election data produced by a black box in which it is 
impossible to see how it created that data”). 
 193 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 194 See Long, supra note 29, at 533–36. 
 195 See id. at 536–37. 
 196 See id. at 537; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E) (2006). 
 197 See id. at 537–38. 
 198 Id. at 538 n.25 (“‘Upon receipt of the issued subpoena . . . the service provider shall 
expeditiously disclose to the copyright owner or person authorized by the copyright 
owner the information required by the subpoena. . . .’” (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(5))). 
 199 Id. at 538. 
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mechanism for software owners to suppress any dissemination of 
materials concerning proprietary information on voting 
machines.200 
The software developer for voting machines and/or owner 
typically use both copyright201 and trade secrecy protection for 
their works as proprietary intellectual property, because trade 
secrecy provides advantages to the vendors in addition to those 
available under copyright or patent.202  Again the intellectual 
property protections available to the DRE vendor and its software 
appear to outweigh the voting rights concern of the public. 
V. TRADE SECRETS—STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION 
The intellectual property protection which provides more 
extensive coverage for the software contained in DREs is the 
commercial tool of trade secrets.203  State laws generally provide 
protection for intellectual property as technological information 
through trade secrets.204 While copyright protection for a product 
emanates from federal law, trade secret protections generally are 
 
 200 Id. at 543 (suggesting that DRE vendor Diebold’s use of procedures designed to 
prohibit digital piracy to prohibit the dissemination of information regarding e-voting 
security highlights the problematic nature of DMCA procedures and the imminent threat 
to “the free circulation of speech and information”). 
 201 See supra notes 162–84.  Copyright duration is extensive: for works created after 
1977, the term is 70 years plus the author’s lifetime; for works made for hire, the term is 
95 years from first publication or 120 years from the year of creation whichever expires 
first. 17 U.S.C. § 302. 
 202 See Levine, supra note 7, at 135 (“Trade secrecy—the intellectual property doctrine 
that allows businesses to keep commercially valuable information secret for a potentially 
unlimited amount of time—is increasingly intruding in the operation of our public 
infrastructure, including voting machines, the Internet, and telecommunications.”). 
 203 See id. at 136–37 (“Trade secrecy, by its very name, invokes two core interests: 
secrecy and commerce.  It is a singularly commercial doctrine designed to protect 
commercial interests by allowing companies and individuals to keep secret, for a 
potentially unlimited time, those formulas, processes and inventions that afford them 
pecuniary gain.”). 
 204 See LEMLEY, supra note 45, at 4 (“Today, every one of the 50 states protects trade 
secrets in one form or another.”). 
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derived from state law.205  Initially states relied on the Restatement 
(First) of Torts: 
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, 
device or compilation of information which is used 
in one’s business, and which gives him an 
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors 
who do not know or use it.  It may be a formula for 
a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, 
treating or preserving materials, a pattern for 
machine or other device, or a list of customers.206 
Trade secret laws, although adopted in a piecemeal fashion 
from state to state, provide astute vendors with a strong defensive 
enforcement tool for keeping their proprietary software out of 
reach of inquiring minds or auditing hands while copyright 
protection is limited to tangible expressions.207 
 
 205 See Levine, supra note 7, at 155–56 (“By 2005, a form of the UTSA [Uniform Trade 
Secret Act] had been adopted in forty-four states and the District of Columbia.”); see also 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974) (citing state authority for 
trade secret protection). 
 206 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); see also Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act (1939); James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 
171 (2005) (arguing that the unsuccessful marriage of copyright and technology has 
created a new legislative regulation of technological behavior, which may be dubbed 
“technological” regulation). 
For example, the legal entitlements of trade secret law reinforce 
software’s technological ability to keep its creative expression from 
reaching the public.  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act [for 
example] puts its considerable legal weight behind the technological 
access restrictions and copy protection that copyright owners use to 
control their digital goods . . . .  For source code, the more important 
protection is found in trade secret law, a regulatory regime predicated 
on maintaining the secrecy of valuable commercial information, such 
as formulas or manufacturing processes . . . .  Therefore, as long as a 
software developer takes reasonable steps to keep source code secret 
from the prying eyes of competitors and the public, trade secret law 
provides legal remedies for its unauthorized and improper 
appropriation. 
Id. at 171–72, 177 (paragraphing omitted). 
 207 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) provides that copyright protection does not extend to any 
“idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated or embodied in such 
work.”  Note, however, that the subject matter of trade secret law is not limited to 
tangible expression, but allows for protection of an idea that has not been reduced to 
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Gradually states have adopted The Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(“UTSA”) that is now implemented in forty-three different 
states.208  The UTSA provides a starting point for understanding 
trade secret law applicable to the technology inherent in DRE 
voting machines.  UTSA defines a trade secret as: 
information, including a formula, pattern, 
compilation, program device, method, technique, or 
process, that: 
(i)derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and 
not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, 
other persons who can obtain economic value from 
its disclosure or use, and 
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under 
the circumstances to  maintain its secrecy.209 
This broad statutory definition provides the owner of software 
a viable mechanism for preventing copying, reproduction or access 
to the inner workings of the intellectual product under the mantle 
of maintaining trade secret protection.210 
The Seventh Circuit provided a telling description of the 
amorphous nature of a trade secret.211 The concept of trade secrets 
is a chimerical, unanalyzed concept, which arises as a secondary 
 
tangible form as long as there is sufficient concreteness.  See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 
§ 1, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1985) (defining a “trade secret” as “information, including a formula, 
pattern, compilation, device, method, technique, or process”).  Thus the astute business 
person can fashion IP protection for technological concrete “ideas” as well as 
copyrightable tangible products using a combination of both trade secrets and copyright 
protection. 
 208 See 1-5 LESTER HORWITZ & ETHAN HORWITZ, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COUNSELING 
AND LITIGATION § 5.01(1) (MB 2008) (“Although the most frequent source of trade secret 
law was traditionally state common law, since 1980 some 43 states and the District of 
Columbia have enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.” ). 
 209 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1985). 
 210 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
in Cherne Industries, Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc. 278 N.W. 2d 81, 90 (Minn. 1979)  recited 
a “workable test” for trade secret in an employee-employer dispute that can be applied 
generally: “(1) the protected matter is not generally known or readily ascertainable, (2) it 
provides a demonstrable competitive advantage, (3) it was gained at expense to the 
employer, and (4) it is such that the employer intended to keep it confidential.” Id. at 90. 
 211 Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953). 
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consequence of the primary precept that the law expects everyone 
to adhere to the rudimentary requirements of good faith.212  Almost 
any type of knowledge or information used in the conduct of 
business is amenable to being characterized as a trade secret.213 
Even prior to the adoption of copyright protection laws for 
computer software, owners tried to prevent users from copying 
their software by claiming trade secrecy protection for the 
programs.214  Although not without weaknesses, trade secret 
protection provides an appropriate defense for software owners and 
the owners of electronic voting machines to use in protecting their 
intellectual property.  Its chimerical nature allows businesses to 
place many of their intellectual property assets under the protective 
arm of a trade secret defense as long as the requirements are 
met.215 
The weaknesses of trade secret protection occur because of its 
very nature.216  A trade secret can exist only if its proprietor takes 
steps to maintain its secrecy and it is substantially a secret within 
the industry.217  Also independent invention and reverse 
engineering can be used to circumvent trade secret protection.218  
 
 212 E.I. DuPont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917). 
 213 Smith, 203 F.2d at 373. 
 214 See LEMLEY, supra note 45, at 4 (“Against this backdrop, it was important for 
software vendors in the 1970s and early 1980s to establish the rights vis-a-vis users.  One 
way for vendors to prevent users from freely copying their computer programs was to 
claim a program as a trade secret.”). 
 215 See HORWITZ & HORWITZ, supra note 208, § 5.01(1) (“In making a determination 
whether information is susceptible to protection as a trade secret, counsel should 
determine whether it qualifies on each of five points. . . .  (1) Appropriate subject matter; 
(2) Maintained as secret; (3) Not generally known in the industry; (4) Commercialized or 
of potential value; and (5) Concrete.”). 
 216 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490–91 (1974); see Levine, supra 
note 7, at 146–47 n.42 (“Indeed, one of the major differences between trade secrecy law 
and the other three major areas of intellectual property (trademarks, copyrights, and 
patents) is that those three areas have significant statutory support and history . . . .  Thus 
in order to explore the underpinnings of trade secrecy, it is especially important to review 
early case law and those opinions that became the classic statements of trade secrecy’s 
definition, application, and purview.”); see also 15 U.S.C. (codifying trademark law); 17 
U.S.C. (2006) (codifying copyright law); 35 U.S.C. (2006) (codifying patent law). 
 217 Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 490–91.  In order to protect a trade secret the owner 
must work to render the product as immune as possible to reverse engineering or risk a 
diminution of exclusivity. Id. at 476. 
 218 Id. at 476. 
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In order to maintain trade secret protection, the owners of trade 
secrets are required to establish stringent secrecy protocols for 
anyone licensing or using their equipment.219 
Trade secret protections can be used to prevent election 
officials from releasing DRE software to independent auditors for 
a review and testing of the electronic software within DREs.220  
This is particularly important as a second stage check for a security 
audit. 
Simultaneously the term of protection for trade secrets is of an 
unlimited duration.221  The protection afforded by trade secret law 
is both greater and less than that given under patent law.222  Trade 
secret protection is greater than patent law because it is not limited 
to a fixed number of years and does not require novelty and 
invention as in the case of patents.  It affords less protection than 
patent law because other persons can develop the technology 
independently and use it as long as no unfair or fraudulent means 
were used.223  It does not require the originality of copyright nor 
fixation.  In fact, its strength may lie in the owners’ ability to 
maintain it as knowledge and pure information. 
As one scholar phrased it: 
[t]he source of this problem [trade secret protection 
for electronic computer software] is the proprietary 
source code that drives these paperless electronic 
voting machines.  Unlike paper-based voting 
machines, DREs operate entirely by computer, 
meaning that at no stage of the election process can 
the public see the physical counting of the votes.  
Absent access to the source code that runs the DRE, 
 
 219 Id. at 486–87. 
 220 Long, supra note 29, at 551 (“[T]he encryption and security testing exceptions must 
be expanded to allow for legitimate testing, including by amateurs, of encryption and 
security devices.”). 
 221 Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 494 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 222 Id. at 489–90.  Patents are “[a] grant by the federal government to an inventor of the 
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention.” MCCARTHY, supra 
note 44, at 433.  The subject of a patent must be novel, nonobviousness and useful. Id. at 
435; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–02 (2006) (describing what inventions are patentable and 
conditions for patentability). 
 223 See supra note 218. 
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the public has no way of knowing how—or if—the 
machine records and tabulates votes.224 
Computer software programs have been afforded intellectual 
property protection as copyrighted proprietary products and as 
trade secrets.225  The intellectual property laws are ostensibly 
designed to protect the owner’s business advantage while 
encouraging creativity and innovation.226  Copyright infringement 
laws provide swift remedial justice to anyone copying or 
unlawfully acquiring the use of said intellectual property in 
software.227  Trade secret protection provides unlimited duration 
for the intellectual property rights of the owner.228 
The prevailing economic theory on patents and copyrights is 
that intellectual property protection allows the owner the use and 
enjoyment of her property for a limited time.  At the end of that 
time, so the theory goes, the information, technology, and 
knowledge enters the public domain for the use and enjoyment of 
 
 224 Massey, supra note 28, at 234. 
In practice, proprietary code-based DREs have proven to be error-
ridden and prone to security weaknesses because the closed nature of 
the code has forced state agencies to protect manufacturers’ 
intellectual property at the expense of a reliable voting system.  The 
proprietary nature of the code requires a closed state review process 
that has not eliminated serious errors and security flaws because it 
limits the number of people testing the software.  That closed process 
also contradicts public policy and American tradition favoring 
openness through transparent and accountable government. 
Id. at 235. 
 225 See supra notes 182–84, 214–15; see also David Bender, The Future of Software 
Protection: Protection of Computer Programs: The Copyright/Trade Secret Interface, 47 
U. PITT. L. REV. 907, 939 (1986). 
 226 SELL, supra note 153, at 60–61 (“The United States included intellectual property in 
the Constitution . . . .  The emphasis on ‘useful Arts’ underscores the commercial intent 
of the legislation and the utilitarian rationale behind it.  IP rights were devised to create 
incentives for innovation and risk-taking.  This is consistent with both Benthamite and 
Lockean notions of property: ‘with property rights people have an incentive to labour and 
industry will prosper.’”); see Levine, supra note 7, at 137 (“Trade secrecy, by its very 
name, invokes two core interests: secrecy and commerce.  It is a singularly commercial 
doctrine designed to protect commercial interests by allowing companies and individuals 
to keep secret, for a potentially unlimited time, those formulas, processes, and inventions 
that afford them pecuniary gain.”). 
 227 Bender, supra note 225, at 912; see Thomas, supra note 225, at 709–11. 
 228 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 494 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
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the public.229  The monopoly is created to incentivize innovation 
ends.  The author has been rewarded and the discovery, knowledge 
and information become part of the public commons.230 
The protections found in trade secrets do not have a parallel 
theory of replenishing the commons.  It is designed entirely for the 
benefit of the commercial user.231 
Some scholars have argued that copyright’s reach has also 
established a commodification of creativity.  They argue that the 
tools of this commodification process have included the 
alienability of the copyright interest, the long duration of 
copyright, the strong distribution rights and the demise of 
significant user rights.232  This argument posits that the copyright 
owners’ power has expanded vis-à-vis those wishing to use 
copyright material because of a contraction of user rights, to 
include fair dealing/fair use rights and public interests rights.233  
Yet copyright protection does have a limited duration.  It was also 
designed with the competing interests of the public and the 
property interest of the copyright owner in mind. 
In trade secret law, the private stakeholders’ interest and the 
public’s clash in the intersection of public rights and commerce.  
Trade secret law in areas where “private businesses are utilizing 
commercial law standards and norms, including the key tool of 
 
 229 See Michael Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through A Property Paradigm, 
54 DUKE L. J. 1, 33 (2004).  “Allowing such imitation obviously would deter future 
innovators and result in a suboptimal level of innovation.  To prevent this result, the 
patent and copyright laws grant inventors a right to exclude.” Id. 
 230 Id. at 32. 
 231 Id. at 32–33; see Levine, supra note 7, at 136 (“Trade secrecy, by its very name, 
invokes two core interests: secrecy and commerce.  It is a singularly commercial doctrine 
designed to protect commercial interests by allowing companies and individuals to keep 
secret, for a potentially unlimited time, those formulas, processes, and inventions that 
afford them pecuniary gain.”). 
 232 BIRGITTE ANDERSEN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: INNOVATION, GOVERNANCE, 
AND THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 46 (2006). 
 233 Id. at 48. 
This has been accompanied by significant shifts in rhetoric.  Not only 
have the monopoly privileges of intellectual property owners become 
‘rights’, user rights have become ‘defenses’ or ‘exceptions’.  The 
public domain is thus protected by ‘exceptions’ to rights.  Nothing 
could better encapsulate its current vulnerability. 
Id. 
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trade secrecy,” conflicts with the “methods and purpose of 
transparent and accountable democratic governance.”234  Where 
voting machines are involved the public is expecting a device 
which furthers governmental and democratic interests235 not a 
commercially competitive product. 
Recently, the owners of one of the top DRE vendors have 
admitted that the machines include software flaws.236  However, 
without the accessibility of the software for independent audit 
purposes, the public cannot be assured of security and 
accountability in the vote process. 
With the admixture of copyright and trade secret protection in 
the voting machines, the DRE software has a potentially unlimited 
lifetime of protection coupled with strong tools for its enforcement 
against interference.  As a result of this combined protection, the 
software owner in voting machines can maintain unlimited 
intellectual property protection duration and the public does not 
have independent access to the public good.  Critically the public is 
denied access to a fundamental public utility, the election system, 
during the voting process.237 
 
 234 Levine, supra note 7, at 137–38 (“Secrecy, and its attendant goals of pecuniary gain 
and commercial competition, conflict with the methods and purpose of transparent and 
accountable democratic governance.  This conflict is crystallized in the private 
distribution of voting machines.”). 
 235 Id. at 138 (“These machines, replacing older (but not necessarily less reliable) pull-
lever and punch-card systems, are the public infrastructure through which elections are 
conducted, votes are counted, and the results are verified.  They form the backbone upon 
which one can exercise the right to vote; they instill confidence that one’s vote will not be 
disregarded, lost, or erroneously tabulated.”). 
 236 Ellen Gedalius, Company Accepts Blame for Vote Woes, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Aug. 28, 
2008, at 1.  In the Hillsborough County, Florida primary election in August, Premier 
Election Solutions accepted responsibility for a glitch in the system that caused a delay in 
posting the election results. Id.  “The problem occurred because the identification 
numbers for the different databases—for absentee, early, and precinct votes—did not 
match, so the numbers could not be merged into one report.” Id.  Premier stated that the 
$6 million system will work properly in the general election in November. Id.; see also 
Duane Marsteller, Elections Officials Back Machines Despite Reported Glitch, 
BRADENTON HERALD, Aug. 23, 2008, at 1.  Premier Election Solutions notified counties 
across the U.S. that their machines have a glitch that causes the actual counting machine 
to prematurely display a completion screen before all of the votes are uploaded into the 
system to be tallied. Id. 
 237 See Levine, supra note 7, at 140 (asserting that the access to information so 
necessary for a transparent and accountable democratic government suffers as private 
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A. Oligopoly in the DRE Marketplace 
1. The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Voting Rights 
In this section, this Article proposes to use game theory tools to 
describe how the DRE oligopoly acts to upset the balance between 
voting rights and intellectual property rights.238  Both intellectual 
property rights and voting rights are constitutionally protected 
interests.239  Normally, in the face of a conflict between two 
protected rights, the competing fundamental interests would be 
identified and the countervailing interests weighed.  In the midst of 
competing claims, the law would weigh in and survey the 
contextual background, attempt to impose a balancing of the 
interests analysis and ultimately prioritize the rights.  
Unfortunately, in an oligopoly the vendors by collectively 
controlling the price, the output, and supply240 ultimately upset the 
balance between the two rights by asserting primacy for the 
property right over the individual liberty of voting.  They do this 
 
industry both increasingly relies on secrecy to maintain its competitive edge and private 
industry increasingly expands into the provision of public infrastructure and democratic 
functions such as voting).  “[T]rade secrecy law and practices serve many useful and 
important purposes in private industry, but . . . their use in the public infrastructure is 
inappropriate, unexpectedly powerful, and doctrinally unsound.” Id. 
 238 See Piraino, supra note 25, at 18–19.  The small concentrated market of an oligopoly 
makes it easier for the firms to collectively set their output and pricing. See id. 
Recent models of game theory explain why oligopolists are able to 
maintain a price equilibrium at a level above that which would 
prevail in a perfectly competitive market (i.e., above marginal cost) . . 
. . 
. . . . 
. . . Each firm recognizes its interdependence with other firms in the 
market and understands that “its optimal price is a function of the 
price charged by its rivals.”  An oligopolist is aware that its rivals are 
as strongly armed as it is with weapons of price reductions, 
aggressive advertising, and product improvement.  Thus each firm 
will want to avoid prompting aggressive competitive responses from 
its rivals.  If one firm cuts prices in an effort to boost sales, rivals 
may be compelled to match the price cut, not only rendering the 
initial effort to secure additional volume unsuccessful, but making all 
firms worse off than before. 
Id. 
 239 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 240 See supra notes 5, 24–25 and accompanying text. 
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by collectively refusing to allow access to their software for 
independent auditing and testing and by refusing to upgrade their 
technology to address security, accuracy and transparency 
problems.  Their conduct as an oligopoly eliminates non-price 
competition in areas of quality, service and access. 
In examining a game called the Prisoner’s Dilemma,241 we 
observe how two firms collectively can operate to maintain control 
and preclude access.242 
Two hypothetical salesmen, Joshua and Jake, were arrested for 
hacking into a computer system and downloading customers’ 
personal information with the intent to commit identity theft.  At 
the police station, the authorities separated and interrogated them.  
The police offered the following deal to each one separately: 
confess or remain silent.  If Joshua confessed (implicated Jake) and 
Jake remained silent, Joshua would receive one year in prison—a 
short sentence for cooperating with the police and helping to prove 
charges against Jake.  In this scenario, Jake would receive ten 
years. 
If, however, Jake confessed implicating Joshua who remained 
silent, Jake would receive one year in prison and Joshua would 
receive ten years.  If they both confessed, they would each receive 
five years for saving authorities from having to prove the charges 
in trial.  If neither confessed, the authorities might be able to 
sentence them each with six months for unlawful use of computer 
property, but the authorities would not be able to charge either with 
identity theft.  The best strategy for either Joshua or Jake is to 
confess, without cooperating with the other.243 
Confessing is the best strategy for Joshua whether or not he 
knows if Jake is going to confess.  It is also the best strategy for 
Joshua whether or not he knows if Jake is going to remain silent.  
 
 241 See supra note 11 for a discussion of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
 242 ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 4 (Princeton University 
Press 1992) (1958) (describing the classic tool of game theory called a normal-form 
representation, where each player simultaneously chooses a strategy, and the combination 
of strategies chosen by the players determines a payoff for each player); RASMUSEN supra 
note 11, at 21; see also supra note 11 (quoting Rasmusen’s description of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma). 
 243 See supra note 11; see generally RASMUSEN, supra note 11, at 19–22. 
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Joshua does not need to know anything about Jake’s strategy to 
know that the best strategy for him is going to be confession.  The 
same holds true for Jake.  Why?  Because if Joshua confesses, he 
will be better off, no matter what Jake does, and the reverse is true 
for Jake.  The game matrix below represents the choices for the 
two prisoners.  Joshua’s choices are represented by the first 














6 mos,  
6 mos 





1 yrs, 10yrs  5 yrs, 5yrs 
 
Note, the only circumstance which would improve Joshua’s 
and Jake’s situation is a binding agreement to co-operate (deny) 
beforehand. 
If the two men were not able to make a binding cooperation 
pact to remain silent before being arrested, they are engaged at the 
police station in what is known as a non-cooperative game.244  This 
type of game (a zero-sum, non-cooperative game)245 and game 
 
 244 “A cooperative game is a game in which the players can make binding 
commitments, as opposed to a non-cooperative game, in which they cannot.” RASMUSEN, 
supra note 11, at 21. 
 245 DAVIS, supra note 12, at 38 (noting that in game theory, specifically in finite two 
person zero sum games, the minimax theorem operates).  “The minimax theorem states 
that one can assign to every finite, two person, zero-sum game a value V: the average 
amount that player I can expect to win from player II if both players act sensibly.” Id.  
This theorem allows the analyst to simplify the study of games by predicting a sensible 
course of action.  “[T]he outcome is intimately related to both players’ behavior and each 
is at the mercy of the other’s caprice.” Id. at 39.  The term ‘zero-sum’ (or equivalently, 
‘constant sum’) means the players have diametrically opposed interests.  The term comes 
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theory can help us analyze the activities and predict the conduct in 
an oligopolistic marketplace similar to the electronic voting 
machine market. 
In an oligopoly, each firm faces a situation much like a game.  
Each firm must choose a strategy, taking into account the other 
organization’s strategies and reactions to its decisions.246 In the 
current voting machine marketplace, there are two principal 
suppliers: Premier and ES&S (and a third smaller supplier, 
Sequoia), that supply the majority of the machines to the fifty 
states.247  Complaints concerning the lack of accuracy248 of 
electronic voting machines attributable to deficiencies within the 
proprietary software or failure of the vendor to provide properly 
functioning machines are publicly reported.249  Yet the vendors, 
 
from parlor games like poker where there is a fixed amount of money around the table.  If 
you want to win some money, others have to lose an equivalent amount. Two nations 
trading make up a non-zero-sum game since both may simultaneously gain. Id. at 14. 
 246 Sagi, supra note 14, at 277. 
 247 See supra note 1. 
 248 See supra note 38. 
 249 See Nikita Stewart, District's Primary Results Certified, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 
2008, at B01 (reporting a glitch in the primary election held in Washington, D.C. in 
September, 2008 that could have possibly been an error with the Sequoia Voting Systems 
equipment); sources cited supra note 236.  With regards to the primary issues in 
Washington, D.C., the Election Officials and Sequoia Election Systems are not quite sure 
what happened. Nikita Stewart, Lawyers Will Monitor Polls Nov. 4, WASH. POST, Sept. 
30, 2008, at B02.  The District of Columbia maintains that the problem was a faulty 
memory cartridge. Id.  Sequoia, however, vehemently denies this and attributes the glitch 
to human error. Id.  After controversy in the 2006 election in Sarasota County Florida, the 
county commissioners unanimously voted to end their relationship with ES&S, and 
instead have chosen to use Diebold voting machines. Patrick Whittle, Sarasota Switches 
Voting Machine; County Dumps its Old Company and Cuts a Deal With a New Maker, 
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, June 7, 2007, at BS1.  As of August, 2008, touch-screen 
machines set up in half of Ohio’s counties didn’t work properly, and the Secretary of 
State, Jennifer Brunner, wanted Diebold to pay for it. Mark Niquette, Missing Votes 
Spark Lawsuit; Brunner: Touch-screen Machines Defective, Company Should Pay, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 7, 2008, at 01A.  Brunner planned to file a lawsuit to get the 
money back from the equipment and to seek punitive damages after an investigation 
showed that votes in at least 11 counties were “‘dropped’ in elections when memory 
cards were uploaded.” Id.  Premier filed a lawsuit against the state saying that it had 
satisfied its obligations under the contract. Id.  Florida, however, is choosing a different 
type of voting machine from ES&S (one that actually calls for the voter to make a paper 
vote, and not solely electronic) instead of the one used at the election in 2006, but it is not 
specifically stating that the reason is due to previous machine malfunction. Kathy Gill, 
States Abandoning Touchscreen Voting Equipment, ABOUT.COM, Aug. 18, 2008, 
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claiming trade secret and copyright protection, refuse to release the 
software for independent testing prior to an election, or 
independent auditing after an election, or change or alter their 
software allowing open source software.250  As a Princeton 
University computer scientist who conducted testing on Diebold 
(Premier) AccuVote-TS voting machines for code attacks wrote, 
“Mitigating these threats will require changes to the voting 
machines’ hardware and software and the adoption of more 
rigorous election procedures.”251  Strangely, in the face of 
mounting criticism,252 the DRE vendors have not been driven to 
 
http://www.uspolitics.about.com/b/2008/08/18/states-abandoning-touchscreen-voting-
equipment.htm.  Furthermore: 
One way in which fraud could occur is through the use of 
‘homebrew’ smartcards.  When voters show up at telling site, they 
are given smart cards that they insert into the DRE and that allows 
them to receive a ballot.  Computer scientists found that attackers 
could create their own homebrew smartcards . . . . 
. . . This danger was highlighted by the Compuware Report, a 246 
page report commissioned by the state of Ohio, that examined the 
DREs of the four major vendors: Diebold, ES&S, Hart and Sequoia. 
The report found that the four-digit PIN code for the smart card “is a 
factory default from Diebold [that] cannot be changed . . . [and] was 
guessed in less than two minutes of testing.” Voters who are able to 
program their own smartcards have the ability to vote multiple times 
on a machine by ignoring the voting terminal’s deactivation 
command. 
Carrier, supra note 3, at 657–58. 
 250 As recently as October 4, 2008, a DRE vendor, Sequoia has appeared in court in 
litigation concerning the accuracy of its machines and opposed the release of an 
independent test conducted on its machines by Princeton computer scientist, Dr. Appel 
regarding the accuracy, and security of its machines. See Diane C. Walsh, Jersey 
Disputes Report Faulting Voting Machines, STAR LEDGER NEWS (Newark), Oct. 18, 
2008, available at http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/index.ssf?/base/news-14/ 
122430339766090.xml&coll=1.  Dr Appel’s report found that Sequoia’s machines could 
“be easily hacked, while a professor from Carnegie Mellon University scoffed at the 
findings, according to two divergent reports released yesterday by the Superior Court 
Judge presiding over the case challenging the machines’ reliability.” Id. 
 251 See ARIE J. FELDMAN, J. ALEX HALDERMAN & EDWARD W. FELTEN, Security 
Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine 1 (Sept. 13, 2006), 
http://citp.princeton.edu/pub/ts06full.pdf. 
 252 Id. at 1 (“Analysis of the machine . . . shows that it is vulnerable to extremely 
serious attacks.  For example, an attacker who gets physical access to a machine or its 
removable memory card for as little as one minute could install malicious code; 
malicious code on a machine could steal votes undetectably, modifying all records, logs, 
and counters to be consistent with the fraudulent vote count it creates.  An attacker could 
VOL19_BOOK3_REDDIX-SMALLS 4/21/2009  7:53:39 PM 
744 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:689 
change and upgrade like most sellers in a competitive market by 
the market demand for upgrade in quality improvement.  Even 
stranger, they have not been challenged by the entry of many new 
upstart firms eager to gain a foothold in a lucrative voting machine 
market fueled by government cash.  The odd situation is 
reminiscent of novelist Lewis Carroll’s phrase, “Curiouser and 
Curiouser,” in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.253 
By viewing an analogous situation in a game, we should be 
able to translate the insights gained into a quantitative model.  
Subsequently, a review of that quantitative model allows us to 
make inferences concerning the behavior of the players.254 
Historically, economists reviewed an oligopoly in terms of 
game theory.255  Game theory, an analytical tool utilized to 
comprehend interactions between persons when each person’s 
actions affect the others,256 should help us predict the actions of the 
players in the oligopolistic DRE market.  Game theory helps to 
explain how oligopolists maintain their actions and conduct around 
pricing.  With so few firms in the relevant market, the firms are 
able to make pricing decisions with reference to the reaction of 
 
also create malicious code that spreads automatically and silently from machine to 
machine during normal election activities—a voting-machine virus.”). 
 253 Lewis Carroll, the author of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, was actually Charles 
Lutwidge Dodson, a mathematics teacher at Christ Church, Oxford. See Martin Gardner, 
The Annotated Alice xxiii (2000) (“He [Lewis Carroll] had a great fondness for playing 
with mathematics, logics and words, for writing nonsense and for the company of 
attractive little girls.”).  Gardner identifies a quote in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, 
as an allusion to game theory, where Alice and the Duchess, a strange character, engage 
in a long conversation: “‘Of course it is’, said the Duchess, who seemed ready to agree to 
everything that Alice said: ‘There’s a large mustard-mine near here.  And the moral of 
that is—‘the more there is of mine, the less there is of yours.’” Id. at 92.  “Carroll seems 
to have invented this proverb.  It describes what in modern game theory is called a two 
person zero sum game—a game in which the payoff to the winner exactly equals the 
losses of the loser.” Id. at 92 n.7.  In a zero sum game what one player gains, another 
player must lose. 
 254 DAVIS, supra note 12, at xv; Piraino, supra note 25, at 18 (“Game theory explains 
how oligopolists can maintain supracompetitive prices without entering into express 
price-fixing agreements.  In an oligopoly, where there are so few firms in the relevant 
market, it is easier for firms to make pricing decisions in ‘reference to the likely reaction 
of competitors.’” (citations omitted)). 
 255 Werden, supra note 13, at 720. 
 256 WALTER J. WESSELS, ECONOMICS 432 (Barron’s Educ. Series 2006) (1987). 
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their rivals.257  As asserted by one legal scholar, the oligiopolists 
recognize their interdependence and the fact that “its optimal price 
is a function of the price charged by its rivals.”258  More 
importantly each firm is “aware that its competitors are armed as it 
is with weapons of price reductions, aggressive advertising and 
product improvement.”259 
First, a game is started by naming the rules.  The elements of 
the game are: players, actions, payoffs and information.260  The 
objective of the game theorist is to describe a situation in terms of 
the rules of the games in order to explain what will happen in that 
situation.261  The rules also have to specify the steps or actions the 
players can take in a situation.  For our purposes, the actions could 
include: allowing or restricting access; lowering or raising prices; 
offering or refusing to offer better quality; and/or better service.  
The rules would include the pertinent information each player 
possesses concerning the market, i.e. the demand for the products.  
The rules would also have to provide for the amount of 
information each player possesses concerning the other players.  
Finally, the rules would have to allow for information to include 
the profits each player receives from the steps taken by all players 
and the optimal profit which determines the outcome of the 
game.262 
Two types of games are relevant to our study of oligopolies: 
one shot games263 and repeated games.264  One shot games are 
 
 257 Piraino, supra note 25, at 19. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. 
 260 GIBBONS, supra note 242, at 3 (“The normal-form representation of a game 
specifies: (1) the players in the game, (2) the strategies available to each player, and (3) 
the payoff received by each player for each combination of strategies that could be 
chosen by the players.”). 
 261 RASMUSEN, supra note 11, at 12. 
 262 Werden, supra note 13, at 721. 
 263 Werden opines that one shot games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma: 
[A]re a mainstay of modern economic thinking about competition 
even though they are criticized for abstracting from the real-world 
fact that competitors meet again and again.  Economists nevertheless 
believe one-shot game oligopoly models provide useful, if imperfect 
predictions of the behavior of real world oligopolies, and these 
models have been found to explain . . . reasonably well the levels of 
prices and profits typically observed in real-world industries. 
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those which are played only once whereas repeated games are 
those where the same game is played many times.265  A game 
theorist observed: 
In game settings, such as the prisoners’ dilemma 
game, each player’s goal is to find her payoff 
maximizing strategy, taking into account the rival’s 
strategy.  Such strategies constitute a stable solution 
if neither player has an incentive to change her 
strategy, given the rival’s strategy.  The stable 
solution is called ‘Nash equilibrium’ after John 
Nash who developed the concept.266 
Returning to the game theory application of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma in looking at how oligopolies work, we can see that 
normally the DRE vendors would always have an incentive to 
provide access.  Access to the software ultimately creates an 
opportunity for a larger market share and increased profits. 
For example, suppose you have two players—Vendor 1 and 
Vendor 2—and each produces the same type of  voting machines, 
 
Id. at 759.  In a single shot game each individual oligopolist wants to maximize its profit 
at the end of the period and is not concerned about future actions. Id. 
 264 Id. at 765 (“Repeated game oligopoly models are not understood to make contrary 
predictions.  These models show that pricing coordination is possible under certain 
circumstances, but very few economists take the models so literally that they believe 
coordinated pricing occurs without communication of any form.  A widely held view is 
that repeated game models correctly identify what outcomes are possible in oligopoly, 
but which outcomes actually are achieved is determined by forces outside the models, 
including agreements among competitors.”). 
 265 Willard K. Tom, Application of Game Theory to Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
457, 459 (citing JOHN NASH, Non-cooperative Games, 54 Annals of Mathematics 286 
(1951)).   
 266 Sagi, supra note 14, at 277 n.11 (describing the Nash equilibrium).  A Nash 
equilibrium occurs when all the players are simultaneously choosing the best strategy as a 
reply to the strategy of all other players. See RASMUSEN, supra note 11, at 26 (“Nash 
equilibrium [is reached ] if no player has incentive to deviate from his strategy given that 
the other players do not deviate.”); Werden, supra note 13, at 765 (“Repeated game 
oligopoly models are not understood to make contrary predictions.  These models show 
that pricing coordination is possible under certain circumstances, but very few 
economists take the models so literally that they believe coordinated pricing occurs 
without communication of any form.  A widely held view is that repeated game models 
correctly identify what outcomes are possible in oligopoly, but which outcomes actually 
are achieved is determined by forces outside the models, including agreements among 
competitors.”). 
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yet neither DRE vendor provides access to their software.  Access 
to the software impacts their profitability.  Restricting access keeps 
prices high and earns increased profits.  If Vendor 1 releases access 
to his software, Vendor 1 will gain business since buyers will 
choose the machine that provides more access, transparency and 
potential accuracy.  Vendor 2, on the other hand, by refusing 
access will lose business.  If Vendor 2 releases access to the 
software, and Vendor 1 does not, Vendor 1 will lose business.  If 
both release access to their software and fares drop (either because 
other entities reverse engineer or allow buyers to duplicate the 
product) they will both be worse off, if the sales do not increase 
significantly. 
Like the two prisoners, Joshua and Jake, the best individual 
strategy for Vendor 1 and Vendor 2 is to provide access to their 
software.  If they are involved in a non-cooperative scenario, the 
best strategy for each firm individually is to provide a machine 
with access to the software.  No matter what the other vendor does, 
the individual optimal strategy, or Nash equilibrium for each is to 
provide access.267  The following matrix268 represents the pay-offs 
in the two vendor (V1, V2) situation where the decisions involve 
providing access to software or denying access. 
  









Vendor 1 gets: 







Vendor 1 gets: 






Should one move before the other, that firm would likely gain a 
larger market share.  That advantage, however, might be short-
lived if the second vendor moved to allow access and a price war 
 
 267 See WESSELS, supra note 256, at 433. 
 268 This matrix is based on a payoff matrix describing strategies utilized by two players 
who are Airline Companies in WESSELS, supra note 256, at 433. 
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ensued.  If this were a one-shot game (no likelihood of repeat 
play), the vendor who first moves to provide access gets the best 
payoff initially.  Assume both parties are denying access and 
receiving profits of $30 dollars, the incentive for both parties 
would be to move towards access.  Assume Vendor 1 and Vendor 
2 start out in the lower right-hand corner where both deny access.  
If Vendor 2 moves towards providing access and if Vendor 1 
continues to deny access, Vendor 2 gets a $120 dollar payoff.  Of 
course, Vendor 1 would then have an incentive to move to provide 
access and his payoff would become $100 dollars.  Vendor 2 now 
also receives $100 dollars.  The incentive is to provide access.  No 
matter what the other vendor does, the dominant strategy is to 
provide access.  A positive outcome for consumers might be a dip 
in prices that could remove entry barriers, allowing new 
competitors into the marketplace. 
Here’s how the conduct of two hypothetical firms in an 
oligopoly might play out in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game using 
price as a variable.  Assume that if “Premiere” charges $3 per item 
it can earn $1000 per day.  Meanwhile, ES&S can also earn $1000 
per day at $3 per item.  If Premiere drops its price and charges $2 
per item, it can earn $2000 per day, but only if ES&S continues to 
charge $3 per item.  If Premiere charges $3, and ES&S drops its 
price to $2 per item, Premiere will earn only $500 per day, while 
ES&S earns $2000 daily.  However, if they both charge $2 dollars, 
then both will earn $800 dollars a day. 
 
 PREMIERE $3 PREMEIRE $2 
ES&S $3 ES&S: $1000 PER DAY 
PREMIERE: $1000 PER 
DAY 
ES&S: $500 PER DAY 
PREMIERE: $2000 PER 
DAY 
ES&S $2 ES&S: $2000 PER DAY 
PREMIERE: $500 PER 
DAY 
ES&S: $800 PER DAY 
PREMIERE: $800 PER 
DAY 
 
The best strategy for both Premiere and ES&S acting 
individually is to charge the lower price.  At the lowest price of $2, 
each firm has an improved outcome regardless of the other’s 
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pricing.  This is identical to the Prisoner’s Dilemma: best not to 
cooperate (confess) which for the hypothetical firms means both 
lowering the price to $2 per item.  The optimal strategy is taking 
the same action (charging $2) independent of what the other 
chooses.269  In an oligopoly (two or fewer), the players are 
strategically interacting.  One firm’s action has a significant impact 
on the other.  This condition is called mutual interdependence.270  
No matter what the other firm/player does, ES&S has an incentive 
to charge the lower price.  The payoff of the lowest price is always 
better because Premiere can always change its position.  The 
reverse holds true for ES&S.  
Remarkably, by pursuing their individual selfish interests and 
not agreeing on the lowest price, both firms end up worse off.  
Ironically, this position may be the best one for the consuming 
public operating the voting machines. 
On the other hand, if everyone cooperates, the best payday 
occurs, where both parties agree to charge the higher price as 
shown in the upper left hand corner.  Both parties get a payoff of 
$1,000 dollars, if they could agree to the higher price.271  This 
game is known as a zero sum non-cooperative game,272 where each 
party chooses the best of the worst: low prices.  Premiere does the 
same analysis and chooses the worst: low prices.  This results in a 
stable point, as both choices coincide.  Each party’s dominant 
strategy is to defect from the agreement.  No matter what the other 
party does, the individual will be better off defecting from any 
agreement to cooperate.  Thus the Nash equilibrium here will be 
for both parties to cheat on the game.273  The main thing we learn 
 
 269 See id. at 442–44. 
 270 See id. at 385. 
 271 Id. at 442–44. 
 272 DAVIS, supra note 12, at 14 (“The term ‘zero-sum’ (or equivalently, ‘constant sum’) 
means the players have diametrically opposed interests.  The term comes from parlor 
games like poker where there is a fixed amount of money around the table.  If you want 
to win some money, others have to lose an equivalent amount.  Two nations trading make 
up a non-zero-sum game since both may simultaneously gain.”). 
 273 Alan Devlin, A Proposed Solution To the Problem of Parallel Pricing In 
Oligopolistic Markets, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1118 (2007). 
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from game theory in single period zero sum games is that any 
agreements are likely to be highly unstable.274 
Let’s return to Joshua and Jake, the hackers in the game.  
Suppose the two belonged to an international gang that engaged in 
heavy-handed enforcement powers.  Assume that the two had a 
pre-arranged binding agreement not to confess.  In fact, if anyone 
confessed, they would either be physically hurt or not be allowed 
to share in the proceeds the gang amassed over the years.  In the 
face of such an agreement, with a potentially binding punishing 
effect, the dominant strategy for each individual would shift.  The 
dominant strategy for each hacker would be to “deny” and obtain 
the higher pay-off. 
Let’s re-examine the vendors conduct above using the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma275  employing the Nash equilibrium276 in a 
repeated game.  Remember, the Nash equilibrium describes a 
situation where persons interacting with each other choose their 
best strategy given the strategies that all the other persons have 
chosen.  The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is known as a two person 
zero sum game, where the players have no common interests.277  In 
a completely cooperative game, the two players have nothing but 
common interests.  For example, two barges approaching each 
other in a river will both want to avoid a collision; a performing 
artist and an audio engineer will both want the performance to 
sound good; an air traffic controller and a airplane pilot will both 
want a safe landing.278 
In a two-person non-zero sum game, the players have both 
competitive and non-competitive or cooperative elements.279  The 
 
 274 Id. 
 275 See supra note 11. 
 276 See supra note 13. 
 277 RASMUSEN, supra note 11, at 25 (“A zero-sum game is a game in which the sum of 
the payoffs of all the players is zero whatever strategies they choose.  A game which is 
not zero sum is nonzero-sum game or variable-sum.”). 
 278 DAVIS, supra note 12, at 81. 
 279 RASMUSEN, supra note 11, at 22 (“The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a noncooperative 
game, but it could be modelled as cooperative by allowing the two players not only to 
communicate, but to make binding commitments.  Cooperate games often allow players 
to split the gains from cooperation by making side payments-transfers between 
themselves that change the prescribed payoffs.”). 
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DRE vendor firms have both competitive interests and interests in 
common or cooperative interests. 
In repeated games, where there is either an infinite number of 
games or there is a finite number of games but where the end 
period is undetermined, it is possible for firms to maintain their 
collusive agreement.280  In fact, the incentive to remain in a 
collusive agreement may be higher because the one period benefit 
of deviating from the agreement is outweighed by the future and 
diminished prices where all of the parties deviate from the 
agreement.281  Calculating all of the factors involved, which 
include each competitors’ pricing, the likelihood of detection and 
the threat of punishment, the Nash equilibrium may well occur at 
the collusive level in a repeated game.282  Using game theory in a 
repeated non-zero game application, the implication that the 
players will collude to arrive at their best strategy begins to 
emerge.283 
Assume the two vendors (“V1”, “V2”) now have to decide if 
they should spend money on research and development to produce 
voting machines with increased security encryptions, and available 
software protections against specific voter glitches and 
malfunctions.  The rules of this game are easily identified.  If only 
one vendor (V1) spends more, it will produce better machines and 
will earn larger profits.  If both vendors (V1, V2) spend more 
money on R&D, then the software will become obsolete faster for 
each machine.  The result will be less profit for both vendors.284 







 280 Devlin, supra note 273, at 1119. 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id. 
 283 See generally id. 
 284 See id. at 1117. 
 285 See id. at 1118. 
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CHOICES Vendor 2 (“V2”) Spends 
a Little 
Vendor 2 (“V2”) 





V2 gets $200 
V1 gets $200 
V2 gets $300 
V1 gets $50 
Vendor 1 
(“V1”) 
Spends a Lot 
V2 gets $50 
V1 gets $300 
V2 gets $100 
V1 gets $100 
 
If both parties were able to collude and agree not to spend 
money on development and research, they would agree to ‘spend a 
little’ and earn more profits.  If they both pursued the maximum 
strategy, they would both ‘spend a lot’ because this is the ‘best of 
the worst.’  If the game is played repeatedly (the decision making), 
i.e., as in the marketplace, then the players become cognizant of 
the other player’s strategy and would both spend a little and not 
spend a lot on research and development.286 
In order to keep the prices at a high level, the vendors need 
either collusion (cooperation), or a repeated game where they can 
detect the other player’s strategy and work to their advantage.  
Even with collusion, the incentive is to cheat unless the players, 
like Joshua and Jake, have a binding agreement: a threat.287  Each 
firm can profit from cutting its price as long as the other firm does 
not.288 
Like Joshua and Jake in the international gang, the two firms 
have an incentive to cheat.  But if they can make a binding 
agreement to co-operate, even if in a repeating game, they can 
ensure that they keep their profits at a supra-competitive level.289 
 
 286 See id. at 1119. 
 287 DAVIS, supra note 12, at 101 (“A threat is a statement that you will act in a certain 
way under certain conditions. . . .  The purpose of a threat is to change someone’s 
behavior: to make that person do something he or she would not do otherwise. . . .  A 
threat is effective only to the extent that it is plausible.”). 
 288 See Devlin, supra note 273, at 1119–20. 
 289 See id. at 1120. 
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Decision making in oligopolies involves price competition, as 
well as non-price competition.  Just as cheating can occur in price 
competition, it can also occur in non-price competition as we saw 
in the Vendor 1 and Vendor 2 game concerning research and 
development.  Either vendor could choose not to comply with the 
agreement and move to another position.  Forms of non-price 
competition include: access, advertising, better service and better 
quality.290 
Before we analyze the DRE oligopoly of the two leading 
vendors for their conduct using non-price competition variables in 
access, software security and transparent standards, let’s examine 
another game.  This time we’ll use a repeated game presented by a 
game theorist involving miniature powdered beignets.291 
 
 Donut Shop II’s Price in ¢ per dozen 
 25 24 23 22 21 
25 (25, 25) (0, 40) (0, 30) (0, 20) (0, 10) 
24 (40, 0) (20, 20) (0, 30) (0, 20) (0, 10) 
23 (30, 0) (30, 0) (15, 15) (0, 20) (0,  10) 








21 (10, 0) (10, 0) (10, 0) (10, 0) (5, 5) 
 
Both owners of hypothetical Donut Shop I and Donut Shop II 
can purchase mini-donuts, called beignet dots from a bakery 
supplier at 20¢ per dozen.  Together their market share in a large 
metropolitan area amounts to 1,000 dozen beignets per day.  Both 
donut shops have sold their product for 25¢ per dozen.  At this 
level they both make a profit ($25) and divide the market evenly—
controlling all of the market for beignets sold in their area.292 
The matrix represents the payoffs for the donut players.  The 
first number in each box represents Donut Shop I’s profit in 
dollars; the second number in each box represents Donut Shop II’s 
 
 290 See Sagi, supra note 14, at 300–01; see also Devlin, supra note 273, at 330–33 
(discussing the effects of quality regulation, advertising, and improved transaction terms). 
 291 See DAVIS, supra note 12, at 85. 
 292 See id. at 84. 
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profit in dollars.  Donut Shop I is thinking of reducing the price 
from 25¢ a dozen.  The products are virtually identical.  Customers 
easily switch from one brand to another if the price is reduced.  
The lower price attracts virtually all of the sales in the market.  
Prices are posted each morning on the stores’ signs.293 
Profits are entered in the matrix.  Those profits correspond to 
the set of prices charged by each vendor.  If Donut Shop I, reduces 
its prices from 25¢ to 24¢, it will capture the entire market and 
reaps $40 dollar profits, but only if Donut Shop II continues to 
charge 25¢.  If Donut Shop I reduces its price to 23¢ and Donut 
Shop II simply reduces its price to 24¢, Donut Shop I still captures 
the market and earns $30 dollars worth of profit.294 
In assessing the payoffs for this game, several items become 
clear.  The vendor should never charge 25¢ if a price change is 
made by the other vendor.  Why?  Because 25¢ is dominated by 
24¢.  If a competitor charges 24¢, he will always do better than his 
rival who charges 25¢.  Nor should a vendor charge less than 21¢.  
Any price less than 21¢ will not return a profit.295 
Once price cutting begins, 25¢ is ruled out.  A competitor can 
always do better than his rival by charging 24¢.  In fact, once 24¢ 
is reached by a competitor, the other vendor can always do better 
at 23¢.  Until one reaches 21¢, the other competitor can always 
move and charge less thereby making more profit.296 
Surprisingly, from a starting point of 25¢ where the players 
received $25 dollars in profits and divided the market evenly, 
logical reasoning pushed the players to the 21¢ block where they 
earned $5 apiece.297 
Playing this game in a non-cooperative strategy results in the 
players reaching the lower price of 21¢ and reduced market profits 
of $5.  The game gets interesting if the players play it more than 
one time.  If a player drops her price one day, the other competitor 
is sure to drop his price the next day; however, if the players 
 
 293 See id. at 84–85. 
 294 See id. at 85. 
 295 See id. 
 296 See id. at 85–86. 
 297 See id. at 86. 
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engage in playing over the course of several days, the incentive to 
drop prices changes.  The players have an opportunity to observe 
the competitor’s strategy.  In addition, they can see where 
cooperation may bring greater payoffs than competition.298 
The contribution of modern game theory is to show 
that the story becomes much more complicated if 
one studies a “repeated game,” in which firms 
interact with the same rivals again and again, and 
know that they will do so.  In such a setting, a firm 
must trade off the short-run gains from cheating 
against the future cost—in one version, the cost of 
never again receiving the supra-competitive price.  
In infinitely repeated games, in which the 
interaction goes on forever, or in games in which 
the end point is uncertain, the firms will be able to 
maintain the supracompetitive price if they are able 
to detect and respond to one “cheating” rapidly.299 
Now, let’s return to our examination of the DRE vendors.  The 
vendors currently restrict access to the software for independent 
auditing and testing,300 experience repeated malfunctions with the 
machines during voting301 and have been criticized for ineffective 
security and accuracy features.302  They also claim copyright and 
 
 298 See id. 
 299 Tom, supra note 265, at 459. 
 300 See supra note 30. 
 301 See Philips, supra note 7, at 1147 (noting Congress’s Government Accountability 
Office was prompted to launch an investigation of the electronic voting machines by the 
number of problems in the 2004 election); Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1740 (noting that 
during the 2004 presidential election, one electronic voting machine in Carteret County, 
N.C., failed to record 4500 votes); John Schwartz, Mostly Good Reviews for Electronic 
Voting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2004, at A20, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/12/politics/12evote.html (reporting that some voters 
had to have their DREs restarted so that their true votes could be recorded).  Tokaji notes 
that another electronic voting machine in Franklin County, Ohio, reported almost 4000 
extra votes for George W. Bush; however, this error was promptly detected and corrected 
by election officials. Id. See generally HARRIS, supra note 7; RUBIN, supra note 7. 
 302 See supra note 8; see also FELDMAN, HALDERMAN, & FELTEN, supra note 251, at 4 
(“One style of [denial of service] attack would make voting machines unavailable on 
election day.  For example, malicious code could be programmed to make the machine 
crash or malfunction at a pre-programmed time.”). 
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trade secret protections for their software in denying access.303  Yet 
scientists have asserted that technology exists at a reasonable cost 
to build a DRE voting system—“including hardware, software, and 
election procedures”—that is secure and reliable.304 
These decisions to deny access by the vendors are puzzling in 
light of the public outcry and demand for improved voting 
machines.  Using game theory tools, it becomes increasingly 
apparent that the DRE vendors are acting cooperatively to further 
their own self-interests. 
First, let’s examine the options available to the vendors in 
deciding how to bundle their voting machine software with 
services.  They could offer a machine which could include 
software only (“S”), or software with licensed access to the 
proprietary code (“SSA”) for random independent audits, or 
software with stricter encryption measures (“SSSE”), or software 
with the newest technology for security measures (“SSST”), or 
software licensed as open source (“SSSSO”) with all of the above 
available security measures.  The vendors could also offer software 
with any combination of the above services.  The profits received 
would be a function of the type of service offered: P{S}(software 
only), P{SSA}(software with access to the proprietary code for 
independent audits and testing), P{SSSE}(software with access 
and stricter encryption measures), P{SSST}(software with cutting 
edge technology for security and elimination of glitches) and 
P{SSSSO}(open source software with the above added 
improvements). 
Initially any software with a new service would attract 
customers.  Based on consumer preferences, the vendor (Vendor I) 
 
 303 Scholars Long and Massey have chronicled in detail the DRE vendors’ arguments 
for copyright proprietary protection in their software. See Long, supra note 29, at 548–
49; Massey, supra note 28, at 235.  Critic Levine articulates the trade secret protections 
afforded software in DREs. See generally Levine, supra note 7, passim. 
 304 FELDMAN, HALDERMAN, & FELTEN, supra note 251, at 3 (“Despite these problems, 
we believe that it is possible, at reasonable cost, to build a DRE-based voting system—
including hardware, software and election procedures—that is suitably secure and 
reliable.  Such a system would require not only a voting machine designed with more 
care and attention to security, but also an array of safeguards, including a well-designed 
voter-verifiable paper audit trail system, random audits and forensic analyses, and truly 
independent security review.”) 
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offering the newer software package, will receive a larger share of 
the market.  Its revenue will rise and its customer base will expand.  
It will gain customers, while simultaneously Vendor II will lose 
customers and revenue.  In the interim, prices may begin to 
modestly decline as other firms enter the market, software open 
source licenses become competitive, and buyers seek other 
computer software developers to customize product.  Vendor II 
will lose customers and revenue.  Vendor II acting strategically 
may offer the new software at reduced prices or change the product 
offered.  Ultimately the price will drop.  Let’s examine the best 
strategy for these two players. 
In the beginning both vendors offer S (software only); they 
share the market equally and earn profits of X.  What happens if 
one vendor defects and tries to offer the voting machine software 
machines with additional services and better quality?  The matrix 
below displays the payoffs.305 
 
 Vendor I’s Choices306 
 
 S SSA SSE SSST SSSO 
S 50, 50 0, 80 0, 60 0, 40 0, 20 
SSA 80, 0 40, 40 0, 60 0, 40 0, 20 
SSSE 60, 0 60, 0 30, 30 0, 40 0, 20 





SSSSO 20, 0 20, 0 20, 0 20, 0 10, 10 
 
Even in the face of an agreement, the best position of the 
individual vendor is to offer one or more of the new improved 
services if it wishes to gain customers, increase its market share 
and improve its profits.  Any such move would cause its rival to 
rethink its position.  There is no advantage for the firm in staying 
in the software only (no access) position when its rival firm moves 
to another position.  In following the equilibrium strategies (and 
 
 305 See DAVIS, supra note 12, at 85. 
 306 Note: there could be any combination of the services offered by the vendors.  It is in 
the best interests of the individual DRE vendor to defect and offer one or more of the 
bundled services.  The vendor will always be better off offering one of the services. 
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there may be more than one) a firm’s most dominant strategy is to 
offer improved services and quality to gain increased profits and 
market share. 
In an oligopoly, we often see that the individual firms which 
normally would seek to maximize profits by pursuing individual 
competitive strategies act collectively to keep prices high, and 
maintain control of output.307  In an oligopoly, this collective 
action can occur if the players can make binding agreements to 
cooperate, like Joshua and Jake.  The binding agreements can 
occur through overt action or tacit collusion.308 
The matrix represents the profits of the vendors.  The first 
number represents Vendor II, the second number represents 
Vendor I.  Those profits correspond to the set of services offered 
by each vendor.  If Vendor II provides a machine with access to 
software (SSA), he moves from a block (S) with 50% of the profit, 
to one with 80% of the profit because of increased market share 
and customer preference.  This DRE (Vendor II) would capture the 
majority of the market.  Vendor I’s share would immediately drop 
to 0.  If DRE Vendor II offers bundling to include increased 
encryption standards (SSSE), his share may drop to 60% profit but 
Vendor I’s profit remains at 0 as longs as Vendor I refuses to offer 
access.  Now look at the positions if Vendor II moves to offer 
access to software (SSA) and subsequently Vendor I moves to 
offer access (SSA) immediately in a repeated play.  They both 
reach market profits of 40%. 
However, as soon as Vendor II moves to offer another 
improved product (SSSE), Vendor I’s profit drops to 0 and Vendor 
II increases his share to 60%.  Ultimately, one of the equilibrium 
points for both parties would be to offer SSSE (Software with 
access and increased encryption standards).  At that point, neither 
 
 307 Shelanski, supra note 18, at 86. 
 308 Piraino, supra note 25, at 16 (“In a perfectly competitive market, with many 
competing firms and easy terms of entry and exit, firms must price at the market level 
(i.e. at marginal cost) or risk losing sales to competitors.  However, in an oligopoly, 
where there are only a few sellers, it is easier for those sellers to cooperate to raise prices 
above the normal competitive level.  Coordination among oligopolists can allow sellers to 
price above marginal cost at ‘supracompetitive’ prices.” (citation omitted)). 
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party would have an increased incentive to move.  Both parties 
would share market share of 30%. 
Yet, an incentive to deviate and keep moving could occur.  It 
would never pay to offer more bundling services than the open 
source (SSSSO) because the parties would barely earn a profit.  In 
fact, the far right corner (10, 10) may represent the lowest profit 
return for the parties providing a complete set of services.  
However, the incentive to offer a machine with improved services 
exists as a Nash equilibrium point.  The only effective way to 
maintain the highest prices (50, 50), in such a repeated game is to 
agree to maintain the pricing as it currently exists and refuse to 
offer improved services.309 
In a one-shot game, like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the players 
have no opportunity to make promises about the future.  Their 
Nash equilibrium is to not cooperate.  Also, if they know their 
actions are interdependent, and yet they will never meet again for 
the next game, there is no incentive to react differently (i.e. to 
cooperate).310  However, the outcome of the game changes if the 
vendors believe that there is a high probability that they will play 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma repeatedly.  In the face of a repeated game, 
rational cooperation between the two vendors becomes much more 
likely.311 
As one theorist states, where the players always believe that 
there is a high probability that they will play the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma again, and if this probability is large enough, with a 
sufficiently high payoff, the repeated game has many Nash 
equilibria.312  In some of these strategies, cooperation is always 
played on the equilibrium path.313 
 
 309 See KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 72–73 (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, UK) (2007); Sagi, supra note 14, at 277 n.11 (“[E]ach player's 
goal is to find her payoff maximizing strategy, taking into account the rival's strategy.  To 
solve the game, the game theorist needs to find the strategies that solve each player's 
problem.  Such strategies constitute a stable solution if neither player has an incentive to 
change her strategy, given the rival's strategy.”); infra notes 310–13 and accompanying 
text. 
 310 BINMORE, supra note 309, at 72. 
 311 Id. 
 312 Id. 
 313 Id. 
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The DRE vendors control the product supply and the level of 
services for each type of machine.  They operate in all 50 states 
and repeatedly conduct their activities. 
By controlling output collectively and refusing to provide 
access, the firms in an oligopoly act like a monopoly.  They sell 
the voting machines with a level of service and technological 
capacity at an inefficient level given the market demand for access 
to the software and accuracy in the output.  Their output is 
produced less efficiently and at a higher cost to society than the 
output which could be produced by firms in a competitive industry.  
They fail to produce at a socially optimal output level.314 
This conduct and behavior is against the firms’ self-interest and 
contradicts a social economic policy of a competitive marketplace 
offering maximum quality at an equilibrium price.315  The 
oligopoly firms operate as a monopoly creating an inefficient 
market where the price of using the voting machines is artificially 
high and the quality of the product  (numerous voting machine 
malfunctions) deliberatively low.316  Consider the conduct of a 
well known monopolist, Microsoft. 
Microsoft, for example, has refused to disclose 
information on the interfaces to its Windows 
operating system, which are necessary for 
competing programmers to create applications that 
are compatible with Windows.  It has been argued 
that Microsoft maintained the secrecy of such 
information to give its applications programmers a 
head start over those developing competing 
applications, as well as to preclude competing 
applications from evolving into an operating 
platform that ultimately could challenge the 
 
 314 Piraino, supra note 25, at 16 (“Economists believe that such prices have two 
significant adverse effects.  First, they harm consumers by transferring wealth from 
purchasers to producers.  Second, they may cause purchasers to forego buying a product 
entirely.” (citations omitted)). 
 315 Id. (noting that the potential losses from purchasers foregoing buying a product are 
“not offset by any gain to sellers”). 
 316 See id. at 36 (arguing that protecting Microsoft’s monopoly “reduces Microsoft's 
incentive to limit price increases and to continue to innovate in operating system products 
and services”). 
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dominance of the Windows operating system.  In 
declining to disclose such information to outside 
programmers, Microsoft was acting against its 
legitimate self-interest.  It would be in Microsoft’s 
best interest to maximize the number of applications 
that utilize its operating system.  Such a strategy 
would make Windows even more useful to 
consumers and maximize Microsoft’s immediate 
revenue.317 
As in the case of the monopolist, there is no incentive for the 
two (or three firms) to improve quality by allowing access for pre-
election logic and accuracy testing, or independent post-election 
auditing, or licensing open source software.  Like the author asserts 
about Microsoft, when a monopoly [or oligopoly] acts against “its 
self-interest and makes it more difficult for competing applications 
to run on its system, it is reasonable to conclude that Microsoft’s 
[or the oligopolists’] real purpose was to perpetuate its operating 
system monopoly.”318 
Allowing access could reduce the price, lower the entry barrier 
and potentially entice other firms to enter and ultimately eliminate 
the exorbitant monopoly supra-competitive profits.319 
In the DRE marketplace, the preclusion of access for 
independent testing and auditing, the lack of improved security 
measures and the repeated glitches affecting accuracy, directly 
impacts a public good—the voting process.  Using the game theory 
analysis, it is apparent that the firms should strategically provide 
access, or allow open source licensing or some variation which 
would maximize their individual profits.320 
 
 317 Id. 
 318 Id. 
 319 Id. at 37 (“Like monopolists, oligopolists have a greater ability and incentive to 
engage in anticompetitive conduct than firms in less concentrated markets.”).  Piraino 
contends that courts should recognize that when oligopolists act collectively to maintain 
prices, they are exercising the same type of market powers as a monopolist. Id.   He 
argues that such conduct harms consumers by “denying them the choice of alternative 
applications.” Id. at 36. 
 320 See BINMORE, supra note 309, at 72–73. 
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Using a game theory analysis, the refusal of each of the DRE 
vendors to provide access or improved quality can only be 
explained by the existence of some type of cooperative conduct.321  
There are no governmental regulatory impediments to access.  
HAVA, which helped to fuel the oligopoly, does not prohibit 
access.  There are no technological barriers since computer 
scientists have been analyzing these types of software problems for 
decades.322 
A birds-eye view of one state’s voting process highlights the 
control exercised by two oligopolists.  Florida was the site of the 
2000 election dispute that sparked the Bush v. Gore323 ruling.  
Bush v. Gore, in turn, was the impetus for the HAVA Act, which 
provided the cash that has resulted in the current DRE vendor 
oligopoly.324  In the November 2008 general election, sixty-seven 
of Florida’s counties were to use machines that were the product of 
two or three vendors.325  The voting systems were the products of 
Premier Elections, ES&S and Sequoia.326 
Florida’s voting process has changed since the disputed 
presidential election of 2000.  Like the majority of states, Florida 
now operates with DREs.327 These machines, while improving the 
 
 321 HAVA does not require the vendors to restrict access to their proprietary software. 
See HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–545 
(2006)); see also Piraino, supra note 25, at 18 (“[John] Nash emphasized that 
‘interdependence is the distinguishing feature of games of strategy’ in that ‘[t]he outcome 
of a game for one player depends on what all the other players choose to do and vice 
versa.’ . . .  In certain cases, players will choose to cooperate rather than to compete, 
because they will conclude that they have more to gain from committing themselves to a 
collective strategy with their rivals.” (citations omitted)). 
 322 See generally Philips, supra note 7. 
 323 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 324 See 148 CONG. REC. H2597 (daily ed. May 16, 2002) (statement of Rep. Foley) 
(“[W]hether an Al Gore supporter or a George Bush supporter, no one's vote should have 
been called into question. . . .  This bill brings us light-years forward in hoping to never 
revisit that time and that place again.”). 
 325 See Voting System in Use for the November 4, 2008 General Election, 
http://doe.dos.state.fl.us/voting-systems/pdf/VS_Web_Display_10-9-08.pdf. 
 326 Id.  Premier Elections Solutions, Inc. was formerly Diebold Elections Systems. See 
Florida Division of Elections, Vendors of Certified Voting Systems, https://doe. 
dos.state.fl.us/voting-systems/certified-vendors.shtml (last visited Mar. 18, 2009). 
 327 Voting System in Use for the November 4, 2008 General Election, http://doe. 
dos.state.fl.us/voting-systems/pdf/VS_Web_Display_10-9-08.pdf.  Thirty-one states 
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election administration process, are the products of private firms, 
fueled by federal dollars operating in an oligopolistic marketplace. 
The voting process in Florida, like other states, precludes 
public access to the software for independent testing or auditing.  
In addition, local and state governmental entities rely on the 
vendors for training and support.  Most of the counties listed do 
not provide the voters with paper ballots.328  However, many states 
have moved to a voter verified paper receipt.329  The public is left 
to vote on machines where glitches, vote tallying inaccuracies and 
malfunctions are possible. 
No voting system, electronic or otherwise, can be perfect.  The 
problem remains that if a dispute occurs involving the fundamental 
voting interests, the voting rights are subsumed within the 
intellectual property rights asserted by the DRE owners.  Because 
the owners operate within an oligopoly, their collective financial 
interests are set to preclude the public from access to the inner 
workings of the machines to further their financial gains. 
Two constitutional interests, voting and intellectual property 
rights, collide within these electronic voting machines.  The 
alarming result of the vendor oligopoly is private control of a 
fundamental liberty interest. 
 
operate with DREs. See Election Equipment 2008, VerifiedvotingFoundation.org, http:// 
www.verifiedvoting.org/verifier/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2009). 
 328 Voting System in Use for the November 4, 2008 General Election, 
http://doe.dos.state.fl.us/voting-systems/pdf/VS_Web_Display_10-9-08.pdf.  Of the 
sixty-seven Florida counties, thirty-nine used DREs which could not provide a paper 
ballot on demand. Id. 
 329 See Election Equipment 2008, VerifiedvotingFoundation.org, http://www. 
verifiedvoting.org/verifier/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2009).  Of the states exclusively 
employing DREs in elections, Nevada and Utah were the only two states using DREs 
with voter verified paper receipts, while Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, New 
Jersey, and South Carolina used DREs that did not provide voter verified paper receipts. 
Id.  Of the states that offered both paper ballots and DREs in elections, twelve states only 
used DREs with voter verified paper receipts, seven states, along with the District of 
Columbia, only used DREs without voter verified paper receipts, and four states used a 
mixture of DREs that provide voter verified paper receipts and DREs that did not provide 
voter verified paper receipts. Id.  Nineteen states, along with Puerto Rico, did not use 
DREs at all. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
An oligopoly currently operates in the DRE voting machine 
marketplace where federal elections are conducted.  A few 
vendors, fueled by federal dollars provided through the HAVA 
Act, supply the majority of the electronic voting machines to the 
fifty states.  These few vendors refuse to improve the quality of 
their voting machines, provide access to the software or upgrade 
the technology of the machines to eliminate the numerous reported 
glitches, errors and malfunctions of the voting machines.  These 
DRE vendors maintain that the federal and state intellectual 
property protections for their software, both copyright and trade 
secrets, protect their property interests in the voting machines and 
preclude independent access by the interested public for auditing, 
licensing and upgrading purposes.  The fundamental liberty 
interests in voting and access to a fair and fraud-free election held 
by Americans is slowly being subsumed by the claims of 
intellectual property protections for the software. 
Utilizing game theory, it is apparent that the firms in this 
marketplace collectively act to maintain prices, output and quality 
based on financial interests.  Their pricing and output strategy is a 
function of the interdependence and pricing strategies of their rival 
DRE vendors.  The individual self-interests of the vendor would 
dictate changes in the pricing and output decisions to allow access 
to the proprietary software of the DRE machines.  Analysis of the 
DRE vendors conduct, using game theory, leads to the inevitable 
conclusion that these vendors are collectively acting against their 
individual self-interests in improving to maintain monopolistic 
control.  The consequence of the oligopolistic market control is 
that the federal election process is held hostage to vendors’ 
financial self-interest. 
Given the importance of fair and fraud-free elections, the best 
course for resolving the conflict between voting rights and 
intellectual property rights would be for Congress to intervene.  A 
redefinition of the HAVA Act, requiring DRE vendors to provide 
independent auditing and security testing, verified voter paper 
trials, increased security protections and certifications, and 
effective oversight from the EAC could protect America’s most 
fundamental liberty.  Whereas this would likely reduce the profits 
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of DRE vendors due to an increase in competition, the American 
public would benefit. 
Lacking Congressional intervention, the Courts will be 
required to resolve numerous anticipated voting disputes involving 
the DREs.  Their task—balancing a fundamental liberty interest 
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APPENDIX 1: VOTING SYTEMS: STATE-BY-STATE330 
 
 
330  SOURCE: The information in Appendix I was obtained through corresponding state 
websites and state responses to a FOIA request for information regarding electronic 
voting machines.  The twelve voting system manufacturers listed in Appendix I have 
registered with the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and meet the requirements of 
Chapter 2 of EAC’s Testing and Certification Program Manual. See Registered 
Manufacturers, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, http://www.eac. 
gov/voting%20systems/voting-system-certification/registered-manufacturers (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2009).  Note also that Danaher Corporation (Mfg.) supplies to Del., Ky., and Pa. 









1. Advanced Voting 
Solutions 
2 Miss., Va. 
2. AutoMark Technical 
Systems 
0  
3. Avante International  
Technology 
0  
4. Dominion 0  
5. Election Systems & 
Software (“ES&S”) 
39 Ala., Ariz., Ark., Cal., 
Colo., Fla., Haw., 
Idaho, Ill., Ind., Iowa, 
Kan., Ky., Me., Mass., 
Mich., Minn., Miss., 
Mo., Mont., Neb., 
N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D., 
Ohio, Okla., Or., Pa., 
R.I., S.C., S.D., Tenn., 
Tex., Va., Wash., W. 
Va., Wis., Wyo. 
6. Hart InterCivic 12 Cal., Colo., Haw., Ill., 
Ky., Ohio, Or., Pa., 
Tenn., Tex., Va., Wash. 
7. MicroVote General 
Corp. 
3 Ind., Ky., Tenn. 
8. Precise Voting 0  
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9. Premier Election 
Solutions 
31 Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., 
Conn., Fla., Ga., Ill., 
Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., 
Me., Md., Mass., Mich., 
Minn., Miss., Mo., 
N.H., N.Y., Ohio, Pa., 
Tenn., Tex., Utah, Vt., 
Va., Wash., Wis., Wyo. 
10. Sequoia Voting 18 Ariz., Cal., Colo., D.C., 
Fla., Idaho, Ill., La., 
Mich., Mo., Nev., N.J., 





12. Unisyn Voting 
Solutions 
0  
